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Better environmental results depend less on fine tuning theories of environmental
federalism than on improving regulatory performance. Simply put, how we regu-
late is more important than where we regulata Current environmental policy ef-
forts fall short for a number of reasons: technical and information shortcomings,
"structural" or jurisdictional mismatches, and public choice distortions. In this Ar-
ticle, Professor Daniel Esty argues that a theory of optimal environmental govern-
ance must seek to address each of these sources of regulatory failure.
Improved results depend, in par on developing a better capacity to delineate, ex-
change and enforce environmental property rights. Because a property rights-
based environmental regime will not always suffice governmental intervention may
be necessary to mitigate market failures and to improve social welfare. But such
intervention may lead to regulatory failures of various types. A theory of optimal
environmental governance must therefore seek to minimize the welfare losses from
the full range of regulatory shortcomings through strategies that: (1) address
problems at a range of geographic scales; (2) generate a mix of regulatory "compe-
tition" and "cooperation" both horizontally and vertically; (3) remedy information
failures (an especially important category since policymaking today often falls short
for lack of good data and because technological advances offer considerable prom-
ise in allowing us to fill analytic gaps in the future); and (4) promote an appropriate
mix of public engagement and delegation in the policymaking process.
Finally, optimal environmental governance not only must minimize welfare losses
from market and regulatory failures but also must attend to other virtues and
sources of social welfare. The demands of better environmental performance must
be balanced against other competing goals of conmunities such as justice, equo,
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and civic republicanism. This Article maps the current terrain and charts a path
toward such optimal environmental governance.
Much of the recent debate about environmental governance and
regulatory reform has centered on the question of where we should
lodge authority to address environmental problems.1 Some scholars,
such as Henry Butler, Jonathan Macey, James Krier, and Richard
Revesz, have argued for a substantial decentralization of environ-
mental regulation. 2 Others, including Kirsten Engel, Susan
Rose-Ackerman, and me, have suggested that a federal structure,
spreading regulatory responsibilities across various levels of govern-
ment, makes more sense.3 In this Article, I argue that, while the envi-
ronmental federalism debate has political salience,4 improved
environmental results require a significantly broader focus. Indeed,
how we regulate is, in general, much more important than where we
regulate.
I argue here for the development of a theory of optimal environ-
mental governance that maximizes the social welfare delivered by our
regulatory structures by minimizing the harms inflicted by market fail-
1 See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching
Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, Yale L. &
Pol'y Rev. and Yale J. on Reg. 23 (Symposium Issue 1996); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing
Environmental Federalism, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 570 (1996); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating
Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal En-
vironmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210 (1992); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Fed-
eralism Matter? Political Choice in a Federal Republic, 89 J. Pol. Econ. 152 (1981);
Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and Environment: Lessons from the Federal Ex-
perience, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1329 (1992).
2 See Butler & Macey, supra note 1; James E. Krier, The Irrational National Air Qual-
ity Standards: Macro- and Micro-Mistakes, 22 UCLA L. Rev. 323 (1974); Revesz, supra
note 1.
3 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Controlling Environmental Policy: The Limits of Public
Law in Germany and the United States 37 (1995); Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental
Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It "To the Bottom"?, 48 Hastings L.J. 271
(1997); Esty, supra note 1.
4 See William J. Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State
of the Union, 1 Pub. Papers 75, 78-79 (Jan. 24, 1995) (calling for more delegation of envi-
ronmental policy to states); Contract with America 133 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas
eds., 1994) (proposing restrictions on unfunded mandates and other measures to shift regu-
latory primacy away from federal government); Newt Gingrich, To Renew America 9
(1995) (arguing for devolution of regulatory power to state and local governments); Robert
L. Gicksman & Stephen B. Chapman, Regulatory Reform and (Breach of) the Contract
with America: Improving Environmental Policy or Destroying Environmental Protection?,
5 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 9, 18-27 (1996) (critiquing environmental legislation associated
with Contract with America). The politicization of the federalism debate is also evident in
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. See Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental
Mandates and the "New (New) Federalism": Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81
Minn. L. Rev. 97 (1996) (examining implications of Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and
proposing alternative basis for regulatory reform).
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ures and the losses suffered as a result of regulatory failures, subject to
constraints imposed by our desires for justice, liberty, equity, and
other values. Maximizing social welfare demands that we pay atten-
tion to both the structures and the performance 6 of the institutions
that are put in place to assure appropriate pollution control and re-
source management.
More broadly, I argue that improved environmental outcomes
depend on more than regulatory reform 7 Good results depend on
aligning market forces with environmental goals and achieving better-
functioning regulatory regimes. The starting point for efforts to move
toward optimal environmental governance needs to be an emphasis
on developing the rule of law in general and the capacity to delineate,
exchange, and enforce environmental property rights in particulars
5 The problems that arise from uninternalized externalities, pollution spillovers, and
overexploitation of open access resources, leading to a tragedy of the commons, are well
documented. The classic text characterizing environmental pollution as an unintemalized
externality is William J. Baumol & Wallace E. Oates, Economics, Environmental Policy,
and the Quality of Life 75-79 (1979); see also William J. Baumol & Wallace E. Oates, The
Theory of Environmental Policy 14-35 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter Baumol & Oates, Theory]
(defining and examining significant types of externalities). For the seminal article describ-
ing the tragedy of the commons, see Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162
Science 1243 (1968). Since the publication of Hardin's article, it has become commonplace
to view environmental resource management as a commons problem. See, e.g., Carol M.
Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Re-
sources, 1991 Duke L.I. 1, 2-5.
6 The losses from subpar governmental performance come in many forms: decision-
making based on inadequate information; slowness and inefficiency; special interest distor-
tions; and regulatory "capture," whereby government intervention is contorted to serve
narrow interests. See, e.g., J. Clarence Davies & Jan Mazurek, Pollution Control in the
United States: Evaluating the System (1998) (arguing that environmental regulatory fail-
ure stems from fragmented systems of control, complexity of legislative provisions, ineffec-
tive administrative remedies, and scarcity of necessary information); Robert W. Hahn,
Achieving Real Regulatory Reform, 1997 U. Chi. Legal F. 143, 143-46 (explaining that
conventional regulatory approaches fail to take adequate account of economic costs and
benefits).
7 Numerous "regulatory reform" efforts have recently been undertaken. See, e.g.,
Aspen Inst., The Alternative Path: A Cleaner, Cheaper Way to Protect and Enhance the
Environment (1996); Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk
Regulation (1993); Center for Strategic and Int'l Studies, The Environmental Protection
System in Transition: Toward a More Desirable Future (1998); Debra S. Knopman, Pro-
gressive Foundation, Second Generation-A New Strategy for Environmental Protection
(1996); National Envtl. Policy Inst., Reinventing the Vehicle for Environmental Manage-
ment (1995). But good environmental results require a broader understanding of- what is
needed to address pollution control and resource management issues. See Daniel C. Esty
& Marian R. Chertow, Thinking Ecologically: An Introduction, in Thinking Ecologically.
The Next Generation of Environmental Policy (Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds.,
1997) [hereinafter Thinking Ecologically] (arguing for broad-based rethinking of environ-
mental policy, not just regulatory reform).
8 While some of those promoting "property rights" in recent years have had an anti-
environmental agenda, in fact, protection of property rights should be seen as an essential
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Too often, little attention gets paid to the opportunities to design
rules, systems, and institutions to reduce market failures, thereby
eliminating the need for regulation.
Where, however, environmental property rights are not clear, the
mechanisms for the transfer and vindication of these rights are not
available and functioning, the transaction costs of enforcing and ex-
changing property rights are too high, or a market-driven system
yields inequitable results, a property rights-based environmental re-
gime may not be optimal. In these circumstances, governmental inter-
vention may help to mitigate market failures and to improve social
welfare.9 But traditional regulation has not worked well in many
cases. 10 Better regulatory tools and approaches are required.
Recrafting the government role in the environmental domain is
by no means a simple project. Environmental programs un-
derperform for various reasons, all of which need attention to some
degree. A theory of optimal environmental governance must there-
fore seek to minimize the welfare losses from the full range of regula-
tory shortcomings: (1) administrative, technical, and informational
policy failures, (2) structural (or jurisdictional) mismatches between
the scale of an issue and the regulator's jurisdiction, and (3) public
choice distortions." In assessing these sources of regulatory failure, I
argue that information failures are particularly important, both be-
cause policymaking today often falls short for lack of good data and
necessary information but also because the dawn of the Information
Age offers considerable promise in allowing us to fill analytic gaps in
the future.
Of course, an overarching theory of optimal environmental gov-
ernance not only must look to minimize welfare losses from market
and regulatory failures but must also attend to other virtues and
element of sound environmental policy. See Carol M. Rose, Property Rights and Respon-
sibilities, in Thinking Ecologically, supra note 7, at 49, 49 (discussing how "the safeguard-
ing of property, far from conflicting with environmental protection, can be an extremely
important vehicle to smooth these frictions").
9 See Charles Wolf, Jr., Markets or Governments: Choosing Between Imperfect Al-
ternatives 155 (1993) ("If the preferred and predominant choice is in favor of the market, a
significant role for the nonmarket... will and, for reasons relating to the pervasiveness and
inevitability of market failures, should remain."); Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolu-
tion and the Future of Environmental Policy, 1997 U. Chi. Legal F. 159, 160 ("[Tjhe cur-
rent regulatory infrastructure is neither as irrational nor as inefficient as its critics have
claimed."); Paul R. Portney, EPA and the Evolution of Federal Regulation, in Public Poli-
cies for Environmental Protection 7, 11-12 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990) (arguing that
nonregulatory approaches are insufficient due to difficulties in defining rights, prohibitive
transaction costs, and market imperfections).
10 See supra note 7 (listing studies that chronicle regulatory failures).
11 See Esty, supra note 1, at 584-99 (developing taxonomy of policy failures and
describing how these failures occur).
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sources of social welfare.12 The optimal level and type of governmen-
tal intervention require a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis that fac-
tors into the welfare calculus effects beyond the environmental
domain, including impacts on economic growth and other potential
gains or losses in material and nonmaterial well-being.13 Societal
desires for freedom and autonomy for all individuals, a degree of eq-
uity across income groups, and justice, particularly the protection of
property rights, must also be taken into account. The demands of bet-
ter environmental performance must furthermore be balanced against
other competing goals such as desires for the promotion of civic re-
publicanism through popular participation in decisionmaking, close
proximity of government to the citizenry, and an emphasis on the re-
sponsibilities of citizenship and the concomitant strengthening of
communities.
This Article seeks to map this terrain and to clear a path toward
optimal environmental governance. Part I outlines a theoretical tax-
onomy of environmental policy failures. I identify the various ways in
which market failures arise in the environmental domain and explain
the circumstances in which some governmental intervention is likely
to be welfare enhancing. I also provide a structure for analyzing regu-
latory failures, spelling out the range of informational and administra-
tive deficiencies, externalities and structural regulatory inadequacies,
and public choice failures that can cause environmental policymaking
to go awry.
12 For the purposes of this Article, I argue that policy optimization must be seen as a
nuanced utilitarianism combining efficiency and equity, recognizing a pluralism of interests
and values both within the environmental domain and across realms. An "optimal" envi-
ronmental governance structure would therefore seek to maximize social welfare broadly
considered (i.e., factoring in not only all of the costs and benefits of environmental policy
choices but also interconnected social welfare effects from other realms such as economic
growth) subject to fundamental fairness and equity constraints, including the protection of
property rights and the provision of sufficient resources to meet the basic needs of each
citizen. The goal is to minimize the sum of the welfare losses inflicted by unabated pollu-
tion or suboptimal resource management and the costs of government intervention as well
as any losses inflicted by this intervention, while attending to other recognized virtues and
thus protecting property rights and ensuring that basic resources are fairly allocated. But
see Carl F. Cranor, Regulating Toxic Substances: A Philosophy of Science and the Law
126 (1993) (rejecting welfare analysis and efficiency as focus, as wen as, more broadly,
utilitarianism in any form).
13 1 recognize the limits of cost-benefit analyses and risk assessments but see no other
option for rational policymaking. See Daniel C. Esty, What's the Risk in Risk?, 13 Yale J.
on Reg. 603, 611-12 (1996) (book review); see also Daniel A. Farber, Eco-pragmatism:
Making Sensible Environmental Decisions in an Uncertain World 6-11, 44.60 (1999) (ex-
plaining why cost-benefit analysis is useful if not definitive and why dichotomy between
economics and value judgments is false).
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Part II examines a set of environmental issues that are represen-
tative of the environmental policy challenge. While not all-encom-
passing, this set of issues indicates the complexity of environmental
policymaking, the range of variables that must be simultaneously ana-
lyzed and maximized to produce improved policy outcomes, and the
significant degree of uncertainty that is the hallmark of decisionmak-
ing in the pollution control and resource management domain. The
concrete examples set forth in this Part highlight the sweep of market
and regulatory failures that must be addressed.
Part III matches the theoretical analysis of market and regulatory
failures developed in Part I with the real world examples set out in
Part II. I note, in particular, that market strategies seem likely to pro-
vide opportunities for environmental gain as our capacity to gather
and use information improves. I also argue that not all regulatory fail-
ures are equally important. Obviously, in designing environmental
governance structures, particular attention should be paid to those
problems that result in the greatest welfare losses and thus provide the
largest potential for improved performance.
Part IV identifies four core strategies for moving toward optimal
environmental governance. First, I suggest that in a number of cir-
cumstances governments should seek to clarify environmental prop-
erty rights and to strengthen (or create) systems for their exchange
and enforcement. Second, I argue for a multi-tier governance struc-
ture that corresponds to the diversity of issues that must be addressed,
reflects the need to draw upon information at various geographic
scales, and addresses the fact that the "optimal environmental area"
for regulation will vary from highly localized zones to a planet-wide
sphere.
Third, I note that both the theoretical literature on governance
and real world experience argue for regulatory strategies that draw on
information from multiple sources and that are built around a system
of checks and balances. Promoting vigorous and open debate over
problem analysis and policy options is central to getting good results.
I thus call for environmental governance mechanisms that promote
regulatory competition and cooperation both horizontally (among
governments and other entities at a given governance level) and verti-
cally (between contributors to the environmental policy process at dif-
ferent governmental levels).
Fourth, I argue that sound environmental policymaking requires
a balance of public engagement and delegation. There is an intrinsic
value in having people make decisions for themselves and thus feeling
that they have a stake in policy outcomes. Public involvement in the
policy process can also help to ensure that there exists a broad-based
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understanding of the decisions made and a serious commitment to im-
plementing the policies adopted. But many environmental problems
are highly technical and not well suited to popular decisionmaking.
Part IV's core is an attack on the prevailing theories of regulatory
competition, which posit that the benefits of competition can be ob-
tained through horizontally arrayed governmental entities competing
against each other to attract companies, investors, or citizens.14 I ar-
gue that this view of regulatory competition is too thin. Optimal in-
formation generation depends on having a diversity of sources of data
and analysis, and thus environmental governance requires multiple
levels of activity and a diverse range of competitors. It also requires a
transparent policymaking process in which the prevailing wisdom is
subject to constant scrutiny and ongoing review.
Part V acknowledges that the pursuit of optimal environmental
governance represents something of a Holy Grail and that no amount
of tinkering with governance structures and procedures will yield a
system that, in practice, maximizes social welfare. Numerous second
order effects must be tracked, and many nonenvironmental tradeoffs
must be factored into the policymaking process. The difficulties inher-
ent in accommodating divergent environmental values, the complexi-
ties of undertaking cost-benefit calculations across incommensurate
environmental issues, and the particular challenges entailed in finding
a common metric to compare environmental and nonenvironmental
sources of social welfare, especially when uncommodifiable values
play a role, are real. Strategies that mitigate these inescapable trade-
offs, nevertheless, can often be found.
I conclude with a number of observations about the challenge of
moving toward optimal environmental governance. First, the process
is dynamic. Within one jurisdiction, the appropriate division of regu-
latory responsibilities likely will evolve over time. Primary responsi-
bility for environmental decisions will often shift from centralized to
14 See William A. Fschel, Fiscal and Environmental Considerations in the Location of
Firms in Suburban Communities, in Fiscal Zoning and Land Use Controls 119 (Ed, in S.
Mills & Wallace E. Oates eds., 1975) (suggesting that regulatory competition will be bene-
ficial in land use context); Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition
Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. Pub. Econ. 333
(1988) (arguing that local choices under majority rule can lead to optimal policies); Revesz,
supra note 1 (challenging race-to-the-bottom argument as unsupported by existing models
of interjurisdictional competition); Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics of Derihative
Securities Regulation, 14 Yale J. on Reg. 279 (1997) (describing persistence of regulatory
competition in securities domain over time); Charles N. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416 (1956) (arguing that competition among local govern-
ments will lead to optimal provision of public goods); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law,
Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251 (1977)
(arguing that state regulation of securities is preferable to federal regulation).
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more decentralized levels of government as lower level authorities de-
velop greater regulatory capacity and more sophisticated environmen-
tal knowledge bases and information management systems. Thus, a
more devolved regulatory structure makes sense in the United States
today, whereas it might not have in the 1970s. Similarly, the structure
of regulatory responsibilities and approaches that is right for one
country may not be right for another, especially where there are dif-
ferences in the level of economic development and in the sophistica-
tion of existing regulatory processes and other baseline variables.
More fundamentally, the regulatory revolution made possible by
computers and modem information management systems has not yet
been fully realized. In fact, the potential for a more information-rich
system of environmental protection has just begun to be tapped.
Given the complexity and diversity of the environmental problems,
the optimal environinental governance structure will, moreover, be
isomorphically complex and diverse. No regulatory "silver bullet" or
other simple solution to the complex environmental problems of the
modem age exists. 15 Context and circumstances matter significantly.
But our rapidly improving capacity to manage large data sets and sig-
nificant degrees of complexity, as well as to develop systems that
"learn" from past experience, offers the promise of better regulatory
performance in the not-too-distant future.16
Moving toward optimal environmental governance thus requires
a multipronged effort to reduce market failures as well as to develop
systems that minimize regulatory failures and the resulting welfare
losses. Significant interactions and interdependencies exist in identify-
ing governance structures and patterns of regulatory conduct that will
mitigate public choice distortions, structural or jurisdictional failures,
and information inadequacies and inefficiencies. In some cases, ad-
vancing on one set of harms may exacerbate another set of problems.
In other cases, improvements in one area will provide parallel oppor-
tunities for gains in another.
Solving equations with many variables is never easy. But the
human capacity for ever more refined thinking and progress is great.
We must not, in any case, shy away from the challenge. The alterna-
15 Cf. W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary Interna-
tional Law, 84 Am. J. Int'l L. 866, 876 (1990) (describing complexity of human rights con-
siderations and burden of assessing them).
16 See Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1227, 1253-57
(1995) (introducing theory of "reflexive" environmental law that engenders learning and
system improvements over time); J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex
Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmen-
tal Law, 34 Hous. L. Rev. 933 (1997) (applying complexity theory to environmental law).
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tive is the status quo of haphazard and unsystematic environmental
policymaking on less than rigorous analytic foundations. This Article
seeks to nudge forward both the academic debate over how best to




Moving toward optimal environmental governance requires some
sense of the nature of the environmental "problem." In fact, environ-
mental protection is not a single problem but a complex set of pollu-
tion control and resource management issues. The diversity of these
concerns represents a central element of the governance challenge.
Nevertheless, certain underlying causes of environmental problems
can be identified which, in turn, can help us to isolate what sort of
solutions are required and thus what types of regulatory structures
and programs might be beneficial.
A. Market Failures
Economic theory suggests that a free market will produce an effi-
cient and welfare-maximizing level of resource use, production, con-
sumption, and environmental protection if the prices of resources,
goods, and services capture all of the social costs and benefits of their
use. Where, however, private costs, which are the basis for market
decisions, deviate from social ones, market failures occur, resulting in
allocative inefficiency in general and suboptimal resource consump-
tion or pollution levels in particular. Thus, every bit of air pollution
shot out of a smokestack represents a problem, as does each harmful
gallon of water pollution ejected from an effluent pipe or load of
waste leaching toxics onto a neighbor's property.17
All too often, prices in the marketplace do not capture the social
costs (or benefits) of pollution (or pollution control) or the scarcity
value of common resources. As a result, both companies and individ-
uals shift environmental costs that they generate onto others or soci-
ety at large. These externalities must be internalized if the market is
17 Norms against unreasonable and uncompensated pollution harms and in support of
the security of property run very deep. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 821A-22
(1979) (defining public and private nuisances and their liabilities); Carol M. Rose, A
Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and the New Takings Legislation,
53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 265,265-67,272-76 (1996) (discussing "property rights" movement
with respect to reconciliation between public and private rights).
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to produce efficient outcomes.' 8 In addition to these economic effi-
ciency considerations, fundamental fairness and the protection of
property also require that polluters pay for or abate their own emis-
sions19 and that resource users not take more than a fair share of open
access stocks.
Some market failures can be addressed by appropriately allocat-
ing, enforcing, and vindicating the relevant environmental property
rights.20 Particularly in cases where the issue is management of a
scarce resource, clarifying who has a right to access and enforcing lim-
its to claims on the resource will often enhance environmental results.
Declining fish stocks represents a classic tragedy of the commons,
which may be amenable to a property rights response.21 Each individ-
ual fishing boat has an incentive to land as many fish as possible. But
when every vessel pursues the same self interest without constraint
under circumstances where fish stocks are finite, the resource will be
18 See Baumol & Oates, Theory, supra note 5, at 21-23 (suggesting imposition of
"Pigouvian tax" to internalize external costs created by polluters); Harold Demsetz, To-
ward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347, 348-49 (1967) (arguing that
property rights should be arranged so as to internalize as many externalities as possible).
19 This is the core element of justice embodied in the law of torts. See Restatement
(Second) of Torts §§ 821B-822; see also Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fair-
ness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L.
Rev. 1165, 1218-22 (1967) (analyzing compensation through lens of John Rawls's theory of
justice).
20 A great deal of interest has sprung up in recent years regarding the potential for
"free market" environmental protection. See Terry L. Anderson & Donald R. Leal, Free
Market Environmentalism 92-94 (1991) (predicting fewer governmental costs, better infor-
mation, and solutions to evaluative problems using free market environmentalism); Iking
the Environment Seriously (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle eds., 1993) (presenting ten
papers that integrate free market environmentalism into solutions for various problems);
Bruce Yandle, Common Sense and Common Law for the Environment: Creating Wealth
in Hummingbird Economies 170-75 (1997) (summarizing likely effects of markets on envi-
ronmental issues); Terry L. Anderson, Enviro-Capitalism vs. Enviro-Socialism, 4 Kan. J.L.
& Pub. Pol'y 35 (1995) (advocating use of free market environmentalism to provide effec-
tive incentives); Richard L. Stroup & Jane S. Shaw, Environmental Harms from Federal
Government Policy, in Taking the Environment Seriously, supra, at 51, 69-70 (advocating
less governmental management and control of environmental quality). On a basic level,
the only "governance" required would be a basic legal system of tort, contract, property,
and criminal law. See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Markets, Regulation, and Environmental
Protection, 55 Mont. L. Rev. 425, 433-34 (1994) (stating that market functions and liabili-
ties rely on common law); Norman W. Spaulding III, Commodification and Its Discon-
tents: Environmentalism and the Promise of Market Incentives, 16 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 292,
306-07 (1997) (describing free market environmentalists' support of private law
mechanisms).
21 Hardin himself reflected on the problem of fisheries. He wrote: "Professing to be-
lieve in the 'inexhaustible resources of the oceans,' [the Maritime nations] bring species
after species of fish and whales closer to extinction." Hardin, supra note 5, at 1245. For
discussions of proposals to create tradable fishing rights, see, e.g., Neal D. Black, Balancing
the Advantages of Individual Transferable Quotas Against Their Redistributive Effects:
The Case of Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 9 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 727, 729-43 (1997).
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overexploited. Fishing beyond reproduction and replacement rates
occurs and, eventually, fish stocks become depleted, causing a collapse
of the fisheries. If, on the other hand, the fish were owned and the
right to take fish were controlled, the owners would have an incentive
to manage the resource sustainably with an eye toward keeping their
resource optimally productive over time322 Short of establishing ex-
clusive ownership, allocating permits (property rights) for a set fish
catch can ameliorate the resource overexploitation and thus reduce
the scope of the market failure.
Similarly, if people suffering respiratory distress because of air
pollution could identify the sources of the emissions affecting them,
measure the harm inflicted upon them, and negotiate with the polluter
for compensation (or costlessly win damages in a tort case), no market
failure would exist. The polluters would reduce emissions to optimal
levels (where the cost of further abatement would exceed the bene-
fits). Pollution victims would be fully and individually compensated
for their losses. This environmental rights-based outcome would be
superior to regulation, which often fails to calibrate the level of the
externality with any degree of precision and thus imposes corrective
measures designed to internalize the harm (controls or charges) that
either over- or undercorrect. Furthermore, under most regulatory
schemes, polluters get permits-a license to pollute-for free.P Even
if permit fees are required, the money almost always goes into the
general government coffers. 24 Thus, while the community as a whole
collects "damages," individuals are not compensated based on the
harms they have suffered. Those who suffer above-average harm are
not adequately compensated.
At least theoretically, market "enhancement" promises efficiency
and equity gains. A rights-based pollution control system would pro-
mote careful tracking and analysis of environmental harms (to deter-
mine the scope and value of any rights infringement), require
polluters to pay for the damages they inflict (internalizing the exter-
nality), and compensate victims appropriately on an individual basis.25
22 See discussion infra Part ILE.
23 See Rena L Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Jour-
ney from Command to Self-Control, 22 Harv. Envfl. L Rev. 103,115 & n.39 (1998) (noting
that existing regulatory structures do not charge any fees for permits).
24 See, e.g., Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How Can Na-
tional Governments Address a Global Problem?, 1997 U. Chi. Legal F. 293, 306 (describ-
ing revenues that result from environmental taxes and tradable permit auctions).
25 Regulatory regimes could be made to be equally precise in their assessments of who
is suffering damages, how much value to place on the harm, and who should pay compen-
sation to victims. But today's regulatory approaches are expressly designed to short-circuit
these calculations as a way to reduce transaction costs. Indeed, to reduce transaction costs,
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The individualization of such an environmental regime is attractive. It
promises to make every citizen more systematically conscious of his or
her role as an environmental actor and more focused on what is re-
quired to carry out this role in an appropriate and just manner.
While theoretically attractive, markets cannot, in the real world,
solve all environmental problems. Too often, neither the identity of
the property entitlement holder nor the boundary of the property
right is clear. How many fish can a fisherman land before he
overfishes? Does the factory have a right to emit or do the neighbors
have a right to pure air?
Moreover, structures to establish the value of environmental
property rights and to enable their purchase and sale frequently do
not exist. How much should the polluting factory's neighbor claim as
damages? What is the measure of harm when wetlands are destroyed
or a buildup of greenhouse gases creates a risk of climate change? A
lack of knowledge about the existence, size, scope, and value of a
harm frequently prevents those suffering environmental losses from
recovering either through negotiated compensation or legal action.
Better data and information, especially on the fate and transport of
pollution as well as the epidemiological and ecological costs inflicted
by emissions, is therefore a prerequisite to broader reliance on the
market as an answer to environmental problems.26
Even if ownership were clear and property rights values were
easy to ascertain, market-based environmental protection still might
falter for lack of the requisite exchange mechanisms. In many places,
functioning markets supported by tort and contract law do not exist.
In Eastern Europe, Russia, China, and many parts of Africa, legal sys-
tems are not well-enough established to anchor a regime based on the
exchange and enforcement of property rights.27
the government makes a rough calculation of the harm externalized and imposes controls
or collects fees in the name of society generally, without trying to work out precisely who
suffered harms (and without giving individuals compensation). But properly structured
market approaches can help to generate the decentralized information that is needed to
charge polluters and compensate victims fully and fairly.
26 Ironically, some of the strongest advocates for market-based environmentalism in
the political world seem to have missed this point and have recently fought for reduced
investment in the information and analysis needed to underpin market responses to pollu-
tion harms and resource management issues. See Zachary Coile, Think Tank Sunk: Con-
gress Says Its Office of Technology Assessment Is Redundant, S.F. Examiner, Nov. 20,
1995, at BI (describing 1995 elimination of the Office of Technology Assessment); Larry
Witham, Scientists Lament Federal Budget Cuts, Say Funds Are Key to Research Success,
Wash. Tines, Dec. 30, 1995, at A4 (discussing recent cuts in congressional funding for
science and research).
27 See Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection During the Transition to a Market
Economy, in Economies in Transition: Asia and Eastern Europe 357, 361-62 (Wing Thye
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Even in countries that have well-defined markets and rules of
law, transaction costs may still be high, leaving a pure rights-based
environmental regime vulnerable to market failures. In all too many
cases, individual losses are smaller than the transaction costs of bring-
ing a legal action for the vindication of environmental rights, meaning
that harms go unrecompensed. Thus, almost everywhere systems
would need to be created to bring down the cost of vindicating prop-
erty rights (thereby ensuring that individuals are able to protect them-
selves from pollution spillovers or the unauthorized capture of
resources by others) and to facilitate negotiation among parties for
the exchange of environmental property rights.2
In sum, while helpful in some circumstances, an enhanced market
for environmental rights cannot be seen as a panacea. 29 Ownership of
the relevant property rights often is not clear, the value of the rights in
question cannot easily be ascertained, and attempts to exchange or
vindicate environmental fights are costly.30 While technological
breakthroughs may help to address these issues and to make environ-
mental markets function more efficiently in the future, we are still
some distance from a Coasian world of no or low transaction costs in
the environmental property rights marketplace 31
Woo et al. eds., 1997) (describing flawed regulatory systems in former Soviet Union and
other Communist countries).
28 Perhaps housetop emissions monitors could be installed to measure harms and track
down their sources, and an environmental rights clearinghouse might enable claims to be
made and processed quickly and cheaply. where rights cannot now be vindicated easily
and at low cost, efforts would be required to strengthen and streamline the tort law struc-
ture to reduce legal transaction costs and to enable plaintiffs, who might individually be
damaged very little by a particular pollution problem but who collectively may be signili-
cantly harmed, to band together.
29 See Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 Yale
I. 1211, 1215-17 (1991) (detailing limitations of transaction cost analysis using Pareto
test); Robert L. Rabin, Environmental Liability and the Tort System, 24 Hous. L Rev. 27,
29-33 (1987) (discussing inescapable problems of identification, boundaries, and sources of
environmental pollution).
30 Some transaction costs are irreducible and market structures do not address other
social goals such as equity. Moreover, bargaining may be inhibited by some parties holding
out, free riding, or otherwise behaving strategically in ways that drive up negotiating costs.
See Ian Ayers & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facil-
itate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale LI. 1027, 1029-30 (1995) (spelling out bargaining obstacles);
Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner. One More Salute to
Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & Econ. 553, 582-84 (1993) (illustrating strategic behavior under
general average contribution leading to higher costs).
31 The cost of gathering, storing, analyzing, and using information is falling rapidly,
making markets possible where they did not exist previously and improving their perform-
ance where they were previously "thin." See Hamish McRae, The World in 2020: Power,
Culture and Prosperity 172-77 (1994) (describing falling costs of communication and infor-
mation as result of "information revolution").
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Moreover, where resources are inherently open access or com-
mon, such as the air or the oceans, a resolution of the environmental
problem based on an improved regime of property fights will almost
certainly be insufficient. 32 Some sort of external governmental inter-
vention to promote collective action and to overcome the prisoners'
dilemma dynamic that leads to a tragedy of the commons is needed.
Likewise, if nonrenewable resources are at issue or the pollution harm
in question has a long ecological lifetime, an invigorated property
rights regime may not fully address issues of intergenerational equity
and thus may not ameliorate the risk of misallocation of resources and
market failure. In these circumstances, regulation may be required to
reduce allocative inefficiency and welfare losses. Similarly, interven-
tion may be justified if the initial allocation of rights is deemed to be
inequitable or if individuals are not roughly equal in their capacities to
bargain successfully.
B. Regulatory Failures
Government intervention to fix market failures may enhance so-
cial welfare, but these efforts may also go off kilter, resulting in subop-
timal environmental outcomes.3 3 The scope for missteps is wide.
Governments may not have the information necessary to intervene
appropriately to internalize externalities, or they may lack the incen-
tive structures needed to regulate efficiently. Governmental decisions
may also be skewed by structural failures that arise because policy-
makers systematically exclude from their regulatory cost-benefit
calculus some of those who are either causing or suffering harms or
those who might be affected by government action. Regulatory ef-
forts may, furthermore, be distorted by public choice failures. Some-
times governmental outcomes are manipulated by outright corruption
of the decisionmakers. More often, special interest influence on the
decisionmaking process causes policy choices not to reflect the true
will of the people.34
32 Note, however, that market reinforcement strategies maybe still have a role to play.
Acid rain, caused by SO 2 and NO, emissions into the air, has been reduced significantly in
the United States through an emissions allowance allocation and trading regime. See Lily
N. Chinn, Comment, Can the Market Be Fair and Efficient? An Environmental Justice
Critique of Emissions Trading, 26 Ecology L.Q. 80, 88-95 (1999) (describing theory and
practice of tradable permits); infra Part II.D.
33 Governmental failure is the focus of much of the work in modern positive political
theory. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice to
Improve Public Law 10-29 (1997) (discussing public choice failures that pervade govern-
mental processes).
34 Note that the "special interest" may be the polluters who seek to block regulation.
But the problem may also be "capture" of the regulatory process by some subset of the
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A growing literature analyzes the ways that governmental envi-
ronmental performance falls short, producing both unsuccessful ef-
forts to mitigate market failures and new sources of welfare loss to the
regulated community or society in general.35 In analyzing these fail-
ure scenarios, three core categories emerge: (1) information and ad-
ministrative shortcomings, (2) externalities and structural regulatory
inadequacies, and (3) public choice failures.
1. Information and Administrative Shortcomings
Determining what is going wrong when environmental problems
arise is not easy. Pollution is often hard to perceive. Who can see the
ozone layer thinning or recognize the brain damage caused by lead
exposure? Even if a source of harm is identified, specific harm caus-
ers are difficult to track down. Who released the chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs) that caused the Antarctic Ozone hole? From where did the
lead in the air come? Even if a specific source of harm is identified,
the amount of damage inflicted will often be hard to measure. How
do we add up the injuries caused by a smoke-belching power plant?
The combination of harms from multiple sources may be difficult to
disentangle. The possibility, moreover, that various kinds of harms
intermingle to create cumulative effects that are worse (or synergistic
effects that are less harmful) than the individual pollution effects fur-
ther complicates the analysis. Each separate chemical also has its own
dose-response impact on humans and on other species and ecological
resources, making efforts to obtain "perfect" or "full" information
rather daunting. While risk-benefit and cost-benefit methodologies
can help to place a value on environmental harms, these tools are lim-
ited and constrained by the fact that, to some extent, the valuation
question is inescapably political.36
Some degree of uncertainty plagues many areas of government
activity, but few face the pervasive information inadequacies that are
regulated industry who would benefit from certain government-imposed restrictions, by
those with a "solution" to sell, or by environmental advocates who seek to burden pol-
luters with costs as a matter of moral indignation, no matter how large or small the benefits
obtained.
35 See, e.g., Marc K. Landy et al., The Environmental Protection Agency- Asking the
Wrong Questions 238-41 (1990) (offering explanation for EPA failures during Reagan
years); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 2341, 2360-74 (1996) (critiquing federal environmental laws concerning inter-
state spillovers).
36 See Mark Sagoff, We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us or Conflict and Contradic-
tion in Environmental Law, 12 Envtl. L 283, 286-97 (1982) (arguing that values shape
results of cost-benefit analyses); Peter H. Schuck, Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law,
and Politics, 11 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 1, 15-16 (1993) (arguing that science is "contingent"
and "socially constructed").
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found in the environmental realm.37 In addition to the difficulties out-
lined above, further complexities derive from our limited understand-
ing about what policy options might be available to mitigate these
harms and to lower the direct costs of pollution as well as the costs
from the unintended and unforeseen consequences of government in-
tervention. Furthermore, when one risk becomes the focus of regula-
tory action, countervailing risks may be worsened.38 Thus,
information inadequacies represent a significant element of the envi-
ronmental regulatory challenge.3 9
In addition to a lack of data and technical capacity, regulatory
bodies may operate inefficiently or ineffectively.40 Bureaucracies in
general and government entities in particular frequently lack incen-
tives to act otherwise.41 Governments face constant agent-principal
incentive problems.42 Regulators may optimize their own circum-
37 See Alyson C. Flournoy, Legislating Inaction: Asking the Wrong Questions in Pro-
tective Environmental Decisionmaking, 15 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 327, 333-38 (1991) (dis-
cussing nature and extent of scientific uncertainty in environmental decisionmaking);
Sheila Jasanoff, Contingent Knowledge: Implications for Implementation and Compliance,
in Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Ac-
cords 63 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998) [hereinafter Engaging
Countries] (discussing problems with using science and technology in environmental
analysis).
38 See John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in Risk
Versus Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment 1, 10-12 (John D.
Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995) (providing numerous examples of regulation
exacerbating countervailing risks).
39 Moreover, as A. Mitchell Polinsky argues, information deficits tend to drive regula-
tion away from more efficient property rules and toward less precise liability rules. See A.
Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and
Damage Remedies, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 1075, 1100-02 (1980); see also Carol M. Rose, The
Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 Yale L.J. 2175, 2191 (1997) ("Liability rules.., economize
on information.").
40 See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 7, at 10-29 (detailing institutional problems hindering
regulatory efforts); Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of
Federal Environmental Law, 54 Law & Contemp. Probs. 311, 321-47 (1991) (describing
regulatory failure of EPA). But cf. Susan Rose-Ackerman, American Administrative Law
Under Siege: Is Germany a Model?, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1279, 1279 (1994) ("Although re-
form is needed, many critics have overstated their case. The most popular reform propos-
als would destroy much of value in the American system .... Bureaucratic policymaking is
an inevitable consequence of the complexity of problems facing the modem state."). See
generally Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 971-75, 992-94 (1995)
(discussing information costs in decisionmaking under different systems of rules).
41 It is my experience that many, even most, government environment officials work
hard, but some do not. It is more difficult in the public sector than in the private sector to
discipline slack performance and to reward superior results. See James Q. Wilson, Bureau-
cracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It 117-20, 197 (1989) (arguing
that in public sector, it is difficult to assess performance and to distribute rewards and
penalties once assessment is made).
42 See Mashaw, supra note 33, at 121-22 (describing in principal-agent terms problems
of delegated regulation).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 74:1495
HeinOnline -- 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1510 1999
December 1999] TOWARD OPTIMAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 1511
stances, choosing to go home early for example, rather than perform
their assignments with full diligence. Thus, even when decisions have
been made on an adequate base of information, regulatory mistakes
may still arise or costs may escalate because the data analysis underly-
ing the decisionmaking process was not done as efficiently as it could
have been.
2. Externalities and Structural Inadequacies
In addition to the problem of inadequate information, regulation
may not remedy market failures due to a misalignment between the
jurisdiction of the regulators and the scope of the problem at hand.43
Regulators may overlook some of the costs of pollution or resource
mismanagement because the harms fall on outsiders. Or they may
ignore some of the benefits of intervention because the gains would
accrue to those beyond their zone of authority. The voices omitted
from the regulatory cost-benefit calculus may be outside the temporal
view of the regulating authorities as well as beyond their spatial scope.
Thus, uninternalized externalities may persist within a single jurisdic-
tion, across political jurisdictions, or intertemporally. Distinguishing
among these cases is important because they represent different forms
of regulatory failure and therefore require distinct policy responses.
At the outset, it is useful to separate regular externalities (intra-
jurisdictional) from what have been called super externalities (inter-
jurisdictional).44 Regular externalities arise where social and private
costs diverge within a political jurisdiction and the government fails to
correct the situation. The underlying problem may be an information
or technical failure. Regulators may fail to act because they did not
see or could not measure the harm or because they did not understand
its seriousness. If government authorities recognize but ignore a pol-
lution problem, letting harmful emissions go unabated, the issue may
reflect an administrative failure due to a lax bureaucracy. The deci-
sion to overlook a problem may also be intentional. In these circum-
43 The understanding that optimal regulatory structures must include all the potential
victims and cost bearers of a harm has been understood and accepted for decades. See
Baumol & Oates, Theory, supra note 5, at 293-94 (discussing optimality in heterogeneous
setting); Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory
of Groups 46-48 (1965) (discussing costs of providing collective goods); Richard B.
Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementa-
tion of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L.J. 1196, 1215-16 (1977) (explaining that
unless all potential cost bearers are under one jurisdiction, spillover effects vill lead to
suboptimal environmental effects).
44 See Andr6 Dua & Daniel C. Esty, Sustaining the Asia Pacific Miracle: Enmironmen-
tal Protection and Economic Integration 59-60 (1997) (explaining concept of "super
externalities").
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stances, where the regulators choose to respond to the needs of a
subset of their constituents rather than the public interest generally,
the harm can be traced to a public choice failure.
Whatever the cause, so long as the uninternalized externalities
are limited to the geographic scope of a single regulatory authority,
the policy problem-getting the producer or consumer to pay the full
freight for his or her environmental harms-arises from either techni-
cal or political shortcomings, not from a structural failure in the regu-
latory architecture. More importantly, a welfare-maximizing
government has an incentive to try to fix the problem.
In other cases, however, the externality crosses political bounda-
ries, spilling over into other states or countries or into the global com-
mons, beyond the jurisdiction of any nation. These super externalities
represent a more intractable policy problem. Even when there are no
information failures or public choice distortions, an individual jurisdic-
tion has little incentive to regulate transboundary harms optimally (as
viewed from an overarching perspective). 45 If the smoke blows down-
wind beyond your borders, why spend your own constituents' money
to remedy somebody else's problem? Interjurisdictional collaboration
is required and is often difficult to achieve under these prisoners' di-
lemma circumstances. 46 To the extent that an issue crosses not just
internal (state, county, or municipal) boundaries but also international
borders, the collective action problem will be exacerbated.47
In the case of climate change, for instance, the harmful green-
house gas emissions blanket the Earth. The harm from anywhere af-
fects everywhere. If a country unilaterally imposes emissions controls,
it bears the full cost of the actions undertaken but will only receive a
tiny portion of the benefits; the balance accrues to everyone else in
the world. The incentive to free ride on the environmental interven-
tions of others is overwhelming.48
As I will discuss in the next Part, in some circumstances reciproc-
ity between neighboring jurisdictions will make cooperation achieva-
45 See id. at 59-63 (discussing collective action problems at international scale).
46 The classic text on this point is Olson, supra note 43.
47 See, e.g., Richard N. Gardner, Negotiating Survival: Four Priorities After Rio 5-14
(1992) (discussing difficulties with international-scale environmental regulations); Robert
0. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy
77 (1984) (stating that "[c]ontemporary international relations are beset by dilemmas of
collective action").
48 See Richard N. Cooper, Environment and Resource Policies for the World Economy
60-61, 83 (1994) (discussing free rider problems in international environmental policy con-
text); see also discussion infra Part II.F.
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ble in response to transboundary problems.49 The United States has
taken action to reduce its sulfur dioxide emissions that cause acid rain
in Canada at least in part because the United States wanted Canadian
cooperation on other issues such as reducing toxic emissions into the
Great Lakes. The problems that arise in the absence of reciprocal
harms can be seen in the example of the northeastern states of the
United States, which have had a hard time getting their midwestern
neighbors to reduce particulates and the smog-causing ozone that
move downwind. Because the prevailing winds blow west to east,
Ohio has little reason to heed the complaints of Connecticut.50 In the
absence of other shared environmental resources that create a sense
of reciprocity (or some other basis for community mindedness), the
collective action problem-the difficulty of getting an agreement on
mutual forbearance and emissions control-becomes nearly
insurmountable.
Such interjurisdictional problems present a serious structural
challenge and generally can only be addressed by authorities acting
from a more overarching perspective, bringing within the ambit of the
regulatory calculus all cost bearers and beneficiaries.51 Cross-border
harms are especially hard to handle in the international environmental
policy context. Agreements between jurisdictions to set and enforce
pollution standards cooperatively from a comprehensive viewpoint
are often not in place. Differences in language, political traditions,
values, and institutions make the transaction costs that must be borne
to foster successful international collaboration even higher than in the
domestic domain.5 2 Because a robust structure of international law is
lacking and one country's judicial system may not enforce judgments
made in another, parties are limited in their ability to enforce interna-
tional agreements. Thus, rights holders in a "victim" jurisdiction may
49 See Note, To Form a More Perfect Union?: Federalism and Informal Interstate Co-
operation, 102 Harv. L Rev. 842,847-50 (19S9) (arguing reciprocity solves collective action
problems).
50 See Paul R. Portney, Air Pollution Policy, in Public Policies for Environmental Pro-
tection, supra note 9, at 27, 86 (describing distribution of costs and benefits for acid rain
controls that burden midwestern states, while mainly benefiting eastern states).
51 See Baumol & Oates, Theory, supra note 5, at 278-83 (describing necessary steps for
addressing transnational pollution); Esty, supra note 1, at 587-92 (discussing "structural
mismatches"); Stewart, supra note 43, at 1211-16 (explaining benefits of centralized envi-
ronmental regulation).
52 See Harold K. acobson & Edith Brown Weiss, A Framework for Analysis, in Engag-
ing Countries, supra note 37, at 1, 1-12 (discussing compliance with international environ-
mental accords).
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well have a hard time getting the upwind or upriver emitters to con-
trol their pollution. 53
Many environmental harms only become apparent over time, as
certain critical thresholds are exceeded or as conditions become more
crowded. 54 When resource management or pollution problems stretch
across time, obtaining optimal environmental results can be further
complicated for reasons that are similar to the difficulties that arise
when problems stretch across space. Activities that seem not to have
caused harm in the past may one day produce serious and apparently
sudden environmental damage. Because the time delays for some en-
vironmental problems will stretch out over decades or even centuries,
the optimal allocation of rights to pollute and responsibilities for the
cleanup may be hard to determine. Future citizens, most notably, are
not around to participate in the decisionmaking process nor are their
views on the optimal level of environmental intervention easy to
discern.55
The prospect of intertemporal resource misallocations is height-
ened by the tendency of politicians to take a short term perspective.
For politicians, the next election looms large. They have what econo-
53 Another nuance to the externality problem derives from the fact that welfare losses
may arise not only from physical pollution spillovers but also from transboundary eco-
nomic impacts or psychological effects. An economic externality occurs when jurisdiction
A sets its environmental standards at a suboptimally low level, inducing competing juris-
diction B to lower its standards or risk the loss of jobs and factories moving to the lower
cost jurisdiction. This "race toward the bottom" in regulatory stringency inflicts potentially
serious welfare losses. See Esty, supra note 1, at 627-37 (explaining why and when eco-
nomic externalities might arise). But see Revesz, supra note 1, at 1222 n.34 (arguing that
economic externalities resulting from relaxed pollution standards in one state are "pecuni-
ary" and not "real"). Similarly, when Americans complain that Brazil is doing too little to
protect the rain forest, while there may be no physical spillover nor even any economic
externality, the sadness felt by many people in the United States represents a real welfare
loss-and a measurable psychological spillover. See Esty, supra note 1, at 638-48 (discuss-
ing concept of psychological spillover).
54 Greenhouse gases, for instance, persist in the atmosphere for hundreds of years and
the impact on the climate will only be apparent fifty or one hundred years hence. See A.R.
Ravishankara et al., Atmospheric Lifetimes of Long-Lived Halogenated Species, 259 Sci-
ence 194, 194 (1993) (noting that some greenhouse gases have lifetimes of over two thou-
sand years); Owen Davies, Air Repair, Omni, June 1993, at 62, 94 (noting that
chloroflourocarbons stay in air for up to one hundred years).
55 An optimal environmental governance structure must therefore induce us to think
systematically about the interests of future generations and to assess the possibility that
current decisionmakers are underattending to the rights of our progeny. See Edith Brown
Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, and
Intergenerational Equity 17-46 (1989) (arguing that legal structures must incorporate inter-
ests of future generations and giving set of principles for that incorporation). Intergenera-
tional equity represents an area of great controversy, however. See Derek Parfit, Reasons
and Persons 356-65 (1984) (arguing against intergenerational duty based on traditional
moral reasoning).
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mists call a high "discount rate."5 6 Thus, they put little value on
harms (or benefits) that will accrue in the future, beyond the two to
four years that remain in their own term of office. Of course, the pub-
lic may discount the future as well. 7 In short, the further problems
stretch beyond the time horizon of a generation or two, the greater
the difficulties of getting present decisionmakers to attend to them.
3. Public Choice Failures
Even if informational gaps or structural mismatches did not cause
regulatory failures, public choice distortions would, in many cases,
lead to suboptimal results. Special interest groups often try to use the
regulatory process to advance their own economic position. As a re-
sult, environmental policymakers frequently do not have the public
interest fully (and only) in mind when they make policy decisions.
Deviation from the public will may be a function of undue influ-
ence exerted by the regulated industry (either resource users or pol-
luters) 5 8 In some cases, polluters will seek to duck responsibility for
the harms they are causing so as to save money. In other cases, "rent-
seeking" economic interests may intervene in the political process to
structure regulations in ways that deliver benefits to them. For exam-
ple, the multibillion-dollar toxic waste cleanup industry has helped to
stall Superfund reform, fearing the demise or reduction of its site
remediation gravy train.59 Likewise, the campaign contributions of
California's farmers have meant that water is delivered to the farms of
the Central Valley at deep discounts from market prices and in
56 Dispute over the proper discount rates to apply to environmental problems runs
deep. See, e.g., Nancy Birdsall & Andrew Steer, Act Now on Global Warming-But Don't
Cook the Books, Fn. & Dev., Mar. 1993, at 6 (arguing against special discount rate for
environmental issues); William R. Cline, Give Greenhouse Abatement a Fair Chance, Fin.
& Dev., Mar. 1993, at 3 (arguing for lower than usual discount rate for long-term environ-
mental policy analysis).
57 One might think that people would care about the well-being of their children and
grandchildren. But "bequest" motives actually appear to be rather weak. See, e.g.,
Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing
Expectations 5 (1978) (noting that people live for themselves rather than for "predecessors
or posterity"); Jed Rubenfeld, The Moment and the Millennium, 66 Geo. Wash. L Rev.
1085, 1090-92 (1998) (describing focus of society to live in present without contemplating
future).
58 See Nathaniel 0. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environ-
mental Policy, 22 Harv. Envtl. L Rev. 313,347-53 (1998) (arguing that environmental regu-
lations reflect industry preferences); B. Peter Pashigian, Environmental Regulation:
Whose Self-Interests Are Being Protected?, 23 Econ. Inquiry 551, 573-79 (1985) (using
voting analysis to show impacts of special interests on environmental policy).
59 See Marc K. Landy & Mary Hague, The Coalition for Waste: Private Interests and
Superfund, in Environmental Politics: Public Costs, Private Rewards 67,77-78 (Michael S.
Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992) (noting that lobbying of waste disposal industry
makes Superfund reform extremely difficult).
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volumes that frequently leave coastal cities parched and the flora and
fauna of the San Francisco Bay Delta desperately short of water.60 In
egregious cases, the regulatory process may be "captured" by narrow
interests. At the behest of friends in the coal industry, for example,
West Virginia Senator Robert Byrd contorted the 1977 Clean Air Act
into a mechanism to protect Appalachian coal mines rather than to
control the burning of highly polluting eastern soft coal.61
Special interests may also have disproportionate influence be-
cause there is no voice speaking on behalf of the diffuse public. 62
Asymmetries in incentives to participate in the political process have
been thoroughly documented. 63 Where pollution control is the cen-
tral issue, each victim generally has too small a stake in the outcome
(being one of tens of millions, for instance, who bear the harm of
breathing the air that is dirtied by coal burning) to be motivated to
defend his or her interest.64 However, the polluters, facing potentially
significant costs to be imposed on a concentrated group of companies,
have a clear incentive to work the political process. 65
Undue influence comes in many forms. It may entail "expert"
material submitted to regulators, or it may be free meals or trips for
60 See Deborah Moore & Zach Willey, Water in the American West: Institutional
Evolution and Environmental Restoration in the 21st Century, 62 U. Colo. L. Rev. 775,
783 (1991) (referring to California State Water Resources Control Board as "captive regu-
lator"); Scott M. Rennie, Comment, Selenium in San Joaquin Valley Agricultural Drain-
age: A Major Toxic Threat to Fish and Wildlife Inadequately Addressed by the Central
Valley Project Improvement Act, 27 Pac. L.J. 303, 309-10 (1996) (discussing detrimental
effects of water diversions on Delta farmland and Delta ecosystem).
61 See Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air 29-35 (1981)
(explaining how Appalachian coal interests affected legislative coalition building around
1977 Clean Air Act).
62 Dan Farber notes that with such severe collective action problems it becomes hard to
explain how we have any environmental law at all. See Daniel A. Farber, Politics and
Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. Econ. & Org. 59, 60-61 (1992); see also William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statu-
tory Interpretation, 74 Va. L. Rev. 275, 285-90 (1988) (arguing that direct interest groups
often subvert public good for private gain).
63 See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tilock, The Calculus of Consent 286-89
(1962) (describing how individuals have differing incentives for participating in political
process); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 723-26
(1985) (arguing that small, close-knit groups can more easily mobilize their members than
large or diffuse groups).
64 See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 Yale L.J. 31, 39 (1991) (groups with diffuse stake in issue tend to be under-
represented in political decisionmaking).
65 A separate literature has emerged to explain how this asymmetry can be overcome.
See Peter H. Schuck, Against (and for) Madison: An Essay in Praise of Factions, 15 Yale
L. & Pol'y Rev. 553 (1997) (defending role of special interest groups in political process);
see also Farber, supra note 62, at 66-67 (positing that environmental successes are function
of "republican moments").
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key legislators to beach or ski resorts. In some cases and in some
jurisdictions, outright payoffs corrupt the decision process.66
Capture may also occur from the environmental side.67 Many
people perceive the Marine Mammal Protection Act,6 8 which requires
the United States to impose sanctions on other countries whose fish-
ing practices do not meet specific U.S. conservation standards, to be
an example of an environmentalist policymaking distortion. A small
cadre of animal rights groups made use of the political process to get
their whale and dolphin protection agenda adopted. They carefully
focused the debate on a set of charismatic mammals and obscured the
costs inflicted by their actions-the prospect of reciprocal trade barri-
ers imposed on U.S. exports-to blunt opposition.69
Other public choice distortions are more subtle. Some public
choice failures arise because of quirks in voting procedures or because
most voting systems do not register the intensity of preferences. 70 In
66 See Brad Knickerbocker, Hopes of Ecological Bliss Elude the Former Soviet Bloc,
Christian Sci. Monitor, Mar. 16, 1994, at 6 (describing how corruption has undermined
environmental enforcement and policymaking). In other cases, a ruling elite's desire to
hang on to power will result in policy decisions that track this goal rather than the environ-
mental interests of the citizenry. China, with severe pollution problems that the govern-
ment leadership largely ignores, represents a classic example of this problem. See Dua &
Esty, supra note 44, at 70-71 (reviewing how unrepresentative government in China leads
to sub-par environmental results); Elizabeth Economy, Chinese Policy-making and Global
Climate Change: Two-Front Diplomacy and the International Community, in The Inter-
nalization of Environmental Protection 19 (Miranda A. Schreurs & Elizabeth Economy
eds., 1997) (discussing how China's political system negatively impacts its environmental
policies).
67 A number of commentators have observed that NIl BYism ("Not In My Back
Yard") often represents political manipulation of local land use decisions by powerful in-
terests. See, e.g., Kent E. Portney, Siting Hazardous Waste Treatment Facilities 10-16
(1991) (describing NIMBY syndrome and its impact on democratic process); James T.
Hamilton, Missing the Mark(et) in Siting Hazardous Waste Facilities, 1 Duke Envtl. L &
Pol'y F. 11 (1991) (arguing that neighborhoods' abilities to organize is significant factor in
siting of hazardous waste facilities); Daniel Mazmnanian & David Morell, The "NIMBY"
Syndrome: Facility Siting and the Failure of Democratic Discourse, in Environmental Pol-
icy in the 1990s: Toward a New Agenda 125, 126-27 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft
eds., 1990) [hereinafter Environmental Policy in the 1990s] (describing causes of NIMBY
syndrome).
68 Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1994).
69 See Alison Raina Ferrante, The Dolphin/Tuna Controversy and Environmental Is-
sues: Will the World Trade Organization's "Arbitration Court" and the International
Court of Justice's Chamber for Environmental Matters Assist the United States and the
World in Furthering Environmental Goals?, 5 J. Transnat'l L & Pol'y 279, 28"-93 (1996)
(detailing international legal problems that resulted from U.S. Mammal Protection Act);
Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global Com-
mons: What We Can Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 Geo. Int'l Envt'I L Rev.
(forthcoming 1999) (describing "tuna-dolphin" conflict and evolution of Marine Mammal
Protection Act).
70 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values 27 (2d ed. 1963)
(demonstrating that some voting methods allow irrelevant candidates to skew election re-
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many decision processes, parties that act strategically (e.g., by holding
out at a critical juncture or by refusing to go along with a commitment
of others to collective action) can undermine public decisionmaking
processes.71
Ultimately, well-organized groups get heard. Interests backed by
money get an audience. Political activists have a voice. Less well-
organized, funded, or sophisticated interests will not have comparable
influence. Systematic diminution or exclusion of less politically pow-
erful groups from the decision process can be seen as an issue of envi-
ronmental justice and thus is a particularly important type of public
choice failure.72
C. Value Disputes and Welfare Losses Beyond the
Realm of Regulatory Failure
To some extent, problems that appear to be environmental policy
failures reflect differences in values that play out in the environmental
governance process. When the year-round residents of the Adiron-
dacks believe they have been shortchanged by state-imposed limits on
development, what underlies their complaint is a dispute over how
much value to place on pristine lakes versus the jobs, recreational
benefits, and economic gains from more hotels and jet ski rentals.7 3
This sort of tradeoff, along with questions such as how much value to
place on a pretty view or on saving a human life, are not issues of
governance but rather of values.
suits and help determine outcome); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being and
Public Choice, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 63, 75 (1990) (providing example of how minority view-
point may have plurality of support at higher levels of aggregate voting). But there is little
evidence that these voting anomalies are a major issue in the environmental domain.
71 See Epstein, supra note 30, at 582-84 (describing effects of strategic behavior on
provision of collective goods).
72 See Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Dis-
proportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 Yale L.J. 1383, 1398-1406 (1994) (discuss-
ing power politics in environmental decisionmaking); Sheila Foster, Justice from the
Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the Transformative Poli-
tics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 775,788-91 (1998) (explaining
that environmental justice addresses both distributive outcomes and exclusion from dcci-
sionmaking processes).
73 See Tom Kenworthy, Adirondack Park at 100 Years Old: Public, Private Pressures
Converge, Wash. Post, May 23, 1992, at A3 (describing Adirondack Park as "a magnificent
refuge of mountains, lakes, rivers and woodlands [that] today stands at a crossroads, a case
study in the collision between environmental and aesthetic values, property rights and lean
state budgets"); Joel Stashenko, Stalled Economy Blamed on State, Environmentalists:
Residents Complain of Insensitivity by Government, Hostility by Advocacy Groups, Buff.
News, Jan. 2, 1998, at 3A, available in Dialog, File No. 733 (describing struggle between
conservationists and development interests).
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Applying values and evaluation is quintessentially a political mat-
ter. It is important to reiterate that there can be no truly optimal envi-
ronmental governance because resource management as well as public
health and ecological protection involve to some degree measuring
the unmeasurable and comparing the incomparable. Optimizing one
set of virtues will often entail compromising on other values. Many
environmental problems have at their core questions over which peo-
ple do not-and need not-agree. At this level, the policy process is
art, not science.
While inescapably political to some extent, the environmental
policymaking process can be sharpened through improved govern-
ance. Indeed, a well-functioning regulatory system will generate in-
formation and analysis to inform decisionmakers, isolate the value
judgments that must be made, highlight the assumptions on which de-
cisions might turn, and tee up the critical political questions for deci-
sion in a fair and unbiased way. By reducing the zone of technical
uncertainty, better decisionmaking structures and procedures narrow
the range of policy disputes.
Ultimately, however, competing visions of the "good" that policy
should achieve and the fact that even scientific or technical calcula-
TABLE 1
TECHNICAL UNCERTAINTY IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICYMAKING
Zone of Values







I Wder Range for Policy Debate for Policy DebteI
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tions have a values-driven dimension make pursuit of a singular opti-
mal policy an elusive goal.74
As I will discuss in detail below, the difficulties that arise in trad-
ing off environmental values against other values render the concept
of social welfare-maximizing policy even more slippery.75 When some
political leaders argue for devolution of environmental decisionmak-
ing, for example, they may be stressing the importance of citizen in-
volvement in decisionmaking as a virtue even at the expense of
technically improved environmental analysis. In effect, they are say-
ing that whatever welfare losses arise from suboptimal environmental
policy decisions are more than compensated for by the citizenship
benefits or other gains obtained by moving decisionmaking closer to
the public.
Optimal environmental governance requires attention to all of
these issues simultaneously. Some observers may balk at the com-
plexity of trying to optimize across so many variables, including a
number of seemingly incommensurate ones. But, of course, this is ex-
actly what policymakers do today, albeit in a rather crude, obscure,
and unsystematic manner. The challenge is to make this optimization
more careful, transparent, thoughtful, and coherent.
II
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
Environmental problems come in many shapes and sizes. That
such a wide range of pollution control and resource management is-
sues fall under the environmental rubric magnifies the difficulty of es-
tablishing optimal governance structures and procedures. Hopes for a
single legal or regulatory approach that would be adequate and re-
sponsive to this full spectrum of issues are misplaced.76 The search for
74 See Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5
Yale J. on Reg. 89, 95-126 (1988) (discussing EPA's attempts to ground regulation on scien-
tific risk assessment); Schuck, supra note 36, at 17-21 (describing biases and prejudices that
affect scientists).
75 Across individuals, values will differ. Even within one individual, an inconsistent set
of core goals and values-a clean environment, economic growth, equity, justice, etc.-wil
often exist and be in some tension with advances in one dimension coming at the expense
of another. The paradigmatic statement of this conflict is in Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of
Liberty, in The Proper Study of Mankind 190, 197-98 (Henry Hardy & Roger Hausheer
eds., 1997).
76 Richard Epstein argues against complexity and for a system of simple rules. See
Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World (1995) (arguing that complexity
has serious social side effects). But see Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complex-
ity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 150, 161 (1995) ("To talk of minimizing complexity
in this context is misguided.... [C]osts and benefits of complexity are not automatic.");
Eric W. Orts, Simple Rules and the Perils of Reductionist Legal Thought, 75 B.U. L. Rev.
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simple solutions in a complex world can be distracting and even de-
structive.77 The pluralism of human values and the diversity of the
environmental challenge-indeed, challenges-must be accepted and
embraced.
In this Part, I describe six different environmental problems that,
while not comprehensive in any regard, do offer a sense of the spec-
trum of resource management and pollution control issues to which
our governance structures must respond. By analyzing these issues
carefully and developing an understanding of how and why welfare
losses arise from them, I believe that some traction can be obtained in
moving toward optimal environmental governance.
A. Protected Areas
Providing for the identification, acquisition, and maintenance of
public spaces is a central aspect of environmental policy. The range of
activities that go on within these common areas-at the neighbor-
hood, town, state, national, and international levels-further demon-
strates the diversity and complexity of the challenges facing
environmental policymakers.
Parks are at constant risk from the classic resource management
problem: overexploitation. 78 Although the problem of too many
cbws on the green in a New England village no longer seems pressing,
the need to allocate time on municipal basketball or tennis courts or
the difficulty of accommodating the number of campers who want to
pitch tents in Yosemite National Park remain very real.
Peace is often restored by creating property rights. Permission is
granted to use a court or tent site for a specified date and a fixed
amount of time. In some cases, the permit (property right) is granted
for free on a first-come first-served or lottery basis. In other cases, a
fee is paid for the right. In either event, tensions over scarce park
resources can be quite easily resolved by the creation of a property
rights regime.79
1441, 1443 (1995) (reviewing Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World
(1995)) (arguing that Epstein "commits a serious error in presuming simple rules are more
desirable than complex ones").
77 Regulatory reform efforts that oversimplify the environmental governance challenge
may be politically attractive and certainly are alluring to the media, but oversimplification
does little to move the policy process forward.
78 See Hardin, supra note 5, at 1244-45 (describing collective action problem that leads
to "tragedy of the commons").
79 There may still be equity questions that must be addressed. Do only those who have
money to buy permits get to use the park? And vindication of the right may be problem-
atic as anyone who has waited to occupy a tennis or basketball court knom.
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In addition to problems of allocating space, parks often face ten-
sions over competing preferences about how to use the commons.
Should a local field be kept undeveloped as open space or converted
into a new set of baseball diamonds to accommodate additional ballp-
layers? Should the decision change if wetlands must be filled to create
the ballpark? Should the pristine lakes of the Adirondacks be pro-
tected from development or opened up to summer jet skiers and win-
ter snowmobilers? Should the Grand Canyon be accessible only to
those willing and able to hike down its steep trails or should there be
accommodation made for those that prefer to travel by mule or who
need wheelchair access? Must the hikers accept a certain degree of
mule dung or should the mule drivers be required to clean up after
themselves? And should those who are hiking or riding on mules be
forced to hear the buzz of sightseeing planes flying above or should
clear and quiet skies be deemed an essential element of the Grand
Canyon experience?
To some extent, information failures underlie these disputes. If
we really knew the value of the resource-for example, the benefit
that open space or wetlands provides as a home of flora and fauna, a
flood plain, a habitat for endangered species, and as an aesthetic and
recreational asset to the community-and could compare this value to
alternative uses such as the recreational benefits (and potential com-
mercial gains) of the ball fields, the scope of the dispute might be nar-
rower. Some investment in better environmental data and cost-
benefit analysis will thus facilitate decisionmaking.
These disputes can also be understood, in part, as issues of exter-
nalities. One person's activities in the park intrude on the enjoyment
of the facilities by others. To the extent externalities are the problem,
Arthur Pigou long ago taught us a solution: Tax the difference be-
tween private and social costs.80 Selling camping permits, by which
the costs that campers impose on the park are internalized, yields
more efficient and reasonably effective resource management results.
If jet skiers and snowmobilers had to pay by the decibel for their activ-
ities, they would generate less noise. And the funds collected could
finance a system of physical separation of the disputing parties, such
as the acquisition of some lands to be set aside for the enjoyment of
those who want to hear nothing more than the glide of a cross-country
ski or canoe. Putting a price on the harm, in this case noise, would,
moreover, induce the manufacturers of these vehicles to find techno-
logical advances to make them quieter.
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Part of the dispute in this case is, however, a boundary problem.
At what point does the noise from a jet ski move from reasonable to
unreasonable-from an acceptable element of the give-and-take of
life to being a nuisance? These questions involve judgment calls and
are really a matter of community standards.81
Where such judgments are required, divergent values come into
play. For example, what are the benefits of keeping the Adirondacks
wild? This question raises inescapably political issues involving aes-
thetic preferences and deep ethical issues concerning the value of na-
ture.r The difficulty of answering these questions can be multiplied
when we add in an intertemporal dimension, specifically the possibil-
ity that future generations might answer the same inquiries
differently.83
While some of the difficulties in managing parks derive from
value clashes that good governance cannot mitigate, other concerns
arise from governmental decisionmaking tainted by special interest
manipulation. Tmber companies that enjoy subsidized access
(through Forest Service road building and other programs) to national
forests or ranchers who graze their cattle on government lands at be-
low-market rates have drawn the ire of fiscal conservatives and con-
servationists alike.84 The granting of special favors to narrow interests
raises serious public choice questions.
In other cases, a fault line emerges between a local community
that seeks economic growth through resource exploitation, such as
those who inhabit many of the depressed towns of the Adirondacks
who would like to rent out jet skis and snowmobiles, and a broader
community, such as the full set of New York residents, who might pre-
fer to see the Adirondack Park protected in a more pristine form.ss
New York State's decision to limit development in the Adirondacks
has, in fact, drawn loud criticism from the locals, who decry elitist en-
81 See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules and
Fines As Land Use Controls, 40 U. Chi. L Rev. 681,729 (1973) (arguing that boundaries of
externalities are set by community norms).
82 See Holmes Rolston I, Environmental Ethics: Values in and Duties to the Natural
World, in Ecology, Economics, Ethics: The Broken Circle 73,86-96 (F. Herbert Bormann
& Stephen R. Kellert eds., 1991) (describing ethical aspects of conservation).
83 See supra note 55.
84 See Ronald J. Rychlak, Changing the Face of Environmentalism, 8 Fordham Envl.
LJ. 115, 118 (1996):
Environmentalists and fiscal conservatives have recently been coming together
on several issues, the most prominent ones being opposition to agricultural
subsidies and corporate welfare. This new alliance has been dubbed the Green
Scissors coalition, and there are other signs of agreement between these forces
which are often at odds with one another.
85 See supra note 73.
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vironmental politics. 86 Their political supporters (or at least the aca-
demics among them) see the development restrictions as yet another
example of overcentralization and therefore a public choice failure.
They argue that permitting larger jurisdictions (i.e., New York State)
to dictate outcomes to smaller ones (particular Adirondack towns or
counties) represents the overriding of community preferences by state
level decisionmakers and is thus an "internality. '8 7 Whether this deci-
sionmaking process is really a regulatory failure depends on how one
defines the scope of the resource and the community that "owns" the
resource. If the resource (i.e., the park) is deemed to be local, the
"matching principle" 88 has been violated. But, given that the
Adirondack Park is owned by the State of New York, decisionmaking
at the state level seems hard to dispute. Thus, complaints from
smaller scale jurisdictions may be vociferous, but in this case, they do
not necessarily represent a structural failure in governance.89
B. Toxic Waste Site Cleanup
Handling polluted land has become a major environmental policy
challenge in the United States. Superfund sites, in particular, repre-
sent a tangled mix of market and regulatory failures.90 At some sites,
chemical plumes spread underground, contaminating the water sup-
plies of neighbors. For decades, these externalities went unattended.
Getting the polluters to pay for the harms they have caused makes
86 See James Dao, Blazing a Power Trail in the Adirondacks, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1993,
at BI (discussing political battles in Adirondacks).
87 On the concept of internalities, see Mancur Olson, Jr., The Principle of "Fiscal
Equivalence": The Division of Responsibilities Among Different Levels of Government,
59 Am. Econ. Rev. 479, 482 (1969) (observing that "internalities" exist when public good
reaches only subset of population in jurisdiction). As Olson notes, "[i]n a situation of this
type and a democratic political system with voting by majority rule, the provision of a
collective good for a local area will hurt more people than it helps, even if Pareto optimal-
ity would have required that the collective good be provided." Id.; see also Esty, supra
note 1, at 587-97 (discussing "internalities" as category of structural governance failure).
88 The "matching principle" argues for governance and the provision of public goods by
authorities at a geographic scale that encompasses substantially all cost bearers and benefi-
ciaries of the policy in question, but no broader. See Olson, supra note 43, at 48, 53-57
(arguing that optimal investment in collective goods requires political boundaries
coterminus with scope of good); Butler & Macey, supra note 1, at 23, 25-26 (defining and
advocating matching principle).
89 It could be argued that this case represents a public choice failure of another sort.
Specifically, it might well be the case that the Adirondack Park management decision pro-
cess fails to take account of intensity of preferences-and thus millions of New Yorkers
who live at a great distance from the park and never use it nevertheless outvote the
thousands who live in or near the resource and whose lives are in substantial ways shaped
by the management decisions.
90 See Analyzing Superfund: Economics, Science, and Law (Richard L. Revesz &
Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995) (reviewing policy problems in Superfund program).
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sense as a matter of efficiency (internalizing externalities) and justice
(those who cause harms should pay). But government efforts to fix
the market failures underlying hazardous waste sites have gone badly
off track and, in fact, have created even deeper problems. 9'
The incentives created by Superfund's liability rules, imposing
joint and several liability as well as strict liability for owners both past
and present, have resulted in stunted environmental cleanups and site
abandonment rather than reuse of older industrial facilitiesY2 Former
factory sites, whether actually contaminated or not, are now shunned
by developers, bankers, mortgage lenders, and insurance companies
due to fears of potential liability for cleanup costs. These so-called
"brownfields" have become dead zones, while new economic activity
shifts to undeveloped land or "greenfields" where toxic risks are per-
ceived to be much lower.
To some extent, the policy failure can be seen as a question of
clouded property rights and a disrupted market. Those engaged in
redevelopment of former industrial facilities, fearing that they might
be, in effect, buying responsibility for cleaning up past toxic wastes,
deeply discount the value of both contaminated and potentially con-
taminated sites.93 The extended reach of the Superfund liability pro-
visions adds to the uncertainty. By confusing the picture over who has
what rights and obligations, the Superfund statute drives up transac-
tion costs, which involve scientific and economic assessments of the
potential toxic waste harms as well as legal determinations about re-
sponsibility for cleanup costs at the time of any resource transfer. The
potential exposure to staggering costs creates a huge incentive to fight
in court rather than to pay up and clean up.
The poor results-abandoned sites, slow cleanups, and huge legal
bills-can also be seen as a function of regulatory failures arising from
information and technical gaps. Until recently, both federal and state
environmental officials often demanded that contaminated sites be
cleaned up to a very high standard (to the point where children could
eat the dirt), driving the value of many properties below zero because
cleanup costs exceeded the probable sale price of the cleaned-up
91 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U. Clii. L Rev. 1423, 1436
(1996) (estimating that Superfund program is so inefficient that four billion dollars is spent
per cancer case avoided).
92 For a discussion of the negative effects of joint and several liability, see generally
Roger C. Dower, Hazardous Wastes, in Public Policies for Environmental Protection,
supra note 9, at 151, 185 (arguing that chance of total liability may cause firms to avoid
disclosing information on contributions to waste sites and to resist entering into agree-
ments to clean up sites).
93 See id. at 183-87 (delineating extensive costs to corporations in owning contaminated
site).
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property.94 The challenge of answering the "how clean is clean" ques-
tion and getting the appropriate degree of cleanup undertaken has
been complicated by a serious lack of ecological and epidemiological
information about who is hurt by these sites, by how much, and what
can be done about it. A number of notorious, if relatively isolated,
cases where cleanup costs skyrocketed into the tens of millions of dol-
lars have made every Superfund site, whether designated by federal or
state law, a source of crushing risk and doubtful economic viability.95
CERCLA 96 also has perverse information-generation incentives.
In particular, companies often find it advantageous not to know
whether their properties are contaminated because having the data
would trigger reporting and cleanup obligations (and costs).
The inaction of Congress in the face of a dysfunctional Superfund
program suggests the presence of public choice failures as well. The
interplay and byplay of interests has resulted in a regulatory reform
stalemate. 97 Many companies are lobbying for "fair" treatment, which
would, not coincidentally, reduce their liabilities. 98 Other observers
see this lobbying as a distortion of the policy process and an attempt
by the corporations to dodge their responsibilities.99 Many environ-
mental groups and leaders are pushing to retain Superfund's liability
rules to ensure that the costs of cleanup fall on corporate polluters as
94 See, e.g., Erin M. Sheridan, How Clean is Clean: Standards for Remedial Actions at
Hazardous Waste Sites Under CERCLA, 6 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 9, 13-21 (1986-87) (describing
regulatory excesses caused by lack of clear standards in CERCLA).
95 In general, it is argued that liability incentives "go too far, too fast" with a net result
that includes "unexpected outcomes and unanticipated costs." Dower, supra note 92, at
184. In 1994, for example, the projected average cost of the cleanup of a site on the Na-
tional Priorities List was $40 million, with costs soaring as high as $500 million. See Steven
P. Ferrey, Allocation and Uncertainty in the Age of Superfund: A Critique of the Redistri-
bution of CERCLA Liability, 3 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 36, 37 (1994).
96 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980,
42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994).
97 See Michael E. Kraft, Environmental Gridlock: Searching for Consensus in Con-
gress, in Environmental Policy in the 1990s, supra note 67, at 103, 111-18 (reviewing con-
gressional environmental policy gridlock).
98 See Superfund: Insurance Group Backs Treasury Proposal, Is Willing to Pay $300
Million Annual Share, 24 Env't Rep. 1175, 1176 (1993) (citing letters to White House writ-
ten by business, insurance, and certain municipal groups asking for elimination of retroac-
tive liability).
99 See id. (citing letter to White House from American Communities for Cleanup Eq-
uity, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), Friends of the Earth, Municipal Waste
Management Association, National Association of Counties, National School Boards As-
sociation, National Association of Towns and Townships, Natural Resources Defense
Council, Sierra Club, and U.S. Conference of Mayors that criticized proposal to replace
Superfund's retroactive liability provisions with tax program as "polluter amnesty
program").
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opposed to the general public.100 But some observers question this
rationale and wonder whether the environmental advocates are being
punitive.' 0 '
It quickly becomes very unclear where the public's interest ends
and where special interests begin. A number of congressional leaders
and their staffs appear ambivalent about Superfund reform, perhaps
fearing diminishment of their power or reduced media attention if re-
form efforts were to succeed.'02 But perhaps they are really defend-
ing the public's interest. Government officials in the EPA and the
state counterpart agencies seem hesitant about restructuring
Superfund, in part because they want to maintain their budgets, staffs,
and influence.10 3 But perhaps they are really defending the public's
interest. The multibillion dollar cleanup industry balks at the prospect
of a smaller market for its services.'04 But perhaps their lobbying is
just a counterweight to the political influence of the polluters. The
Superfund bar has helped to obscure the path toward reform, perhaps
fearing the loss of the tens of millions of dollars in legal fees paid each
year in litigation over Superfund liability.105 But maybe the attorneys
are promoting truth and justice. This confusion has created political
deadlock and less than satisfactory environmental results.
Superfund's sorry history and present difficulties may also be
traceable, in part, to divergent values among the participants in the
100 See id. In addition, courts generally have interpreted CERCLA broadly in an effort
to impose liability on polluters. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem.
Co., 810 F.2d 726, 734 (8th Cir. 1986) ("Congress acted in a rational manner in imposing
liability for the cost of cleaning up such sites upon those parties who created and profited
from the sites."); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D.
Minn. 1982) ("Congress intended that those responsible for problems caused by the dispo-
sal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful condi-
tions they created. To give effect to these congressional concerns, CERCLA should be
given a broad and liberal construction.").
101 Many of the environmental laws of the United States, developed in the 1970s and
early 1980s, are built on the premise that pollution is immoral and should be entirely
stopped. More recent thinking has tended to downplay the moral overtones and to empha-
size the economic inefficiency of uncontrolled pollution. See Esty & Certow, supra note
7, at 3, 4-6 (arguing for less confrontational, more cooperative policies).
102 See supra note 97.
103 See Margo D. Beller, Superfund Reform Bill Draws Fire from Both Sides of Liability
Issue, J. Com., Oct. 30,1995, at 15A (highlighting EPA complaints about Superfund reform
measure); Karen MacPherson, Fuming over Pollution Bill, Pitt. Post-Gazette, Mar. 6,1998,
at A14 (outlining views of EPA chief Carol Browner on Superfund reform).
104 See Landy & Hague, supra note 59, at 78-81 (describing lobbying efforts by Hazard-
ous Waste Treatment Council to "ensure a long-term, continual proliferation of Superfund
sites").
105 See Michael B. Gerrard, Demons and Angels in Hazardous Waste Regulation: Are
Justice, Efficiency, and Democracy Reconcilable?, 92 Nw. U. L Rev. 706, 725 (1998)
("CERCLA has spawned a thousand tales of anguish.").
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policy debate. For some actors, particularly traditional environmental
activists, the liability provisions of the law cannot be compromised, as
these rules represent the moral backbone of Superfund. 106 Other par-
ticipants see the same provisions as punitive and dated, not to men-
tion an obstacle to fast and efficient cleanup of abandoned waste
sites.10 7 How much value to place on the ecological risk from contam-
inated sites-threats to birds, animals, etc.-is also a matter of
contention.
C. River and Stream Pollution
Water quality across the United States deteriorated considerably
over the first six decades of this century because there was little done
to control waste flows into rivers and streams.108 For much of this
period, water pollution was seen as the necessary price of industriali-
zation and economic advancement. As just one example, a Mononga-
hela River thick with toxic chemicals and heavy metals was accepted
as a fair trade for Pittsburgh's progress. 10 9
Even today, decades after it has become clear that emissions into
public waterways are neither necessary nor acceptable, pollution of
rivers and streams remains a serious problem.110 A central reason for
the slow progress can be traced to a lack of information.' It is often
hard to identify the source of water pollution. It is also difficult to
establish just how much harm a particular emitter is causing, espe-
cially when the harms come from diffuse "nonpoint" sources'12 rather
106 See supra note 99.
107 See Gerrard, supra note 105, at 724-25 (reviewing CERCLA's "counterintuitive" lia-
bility system which many consider "inherently unjust").
108 For a brief history of water pollution in the United States, see Robert V. Percival et
al., Environmental Regulation: Law, Science, and Policy 873-75 (1992).
109 See John P. Hoerr, And the Wolf Finally Came: The Decline of the American Steel
Industry 189-91 (1988) (describing environmental costs of steel industry to town of Mc-
Keesport generally and Monongahela River in particular).
110 See Drew Caputo, A Job Half Finished: The Clean Water Act After 25 Years, 27
Envtl. L. Rep. 10,574, 10,577-78 (1997) (noting that pollution of America's waters remains
unacceptably high, even after significant improvements); A. Myrick Freeman III, Water
Pollution Policy, in Public Policies for Environmental Protection, supra note 9, at 97, 110-21
(summarizing several studies and concluding that there has not been dramatic improve-
ment in water quality since passage of Clean Water Act in 1972).
111 Even when information is collected, the data sets are often incomplete. The EPA's
biennial National Water Quality Inventory covers only 17% of rivers and streams and 42%
of other water bodies. See Michael E. Kraft & Norman J. Vig, Environmental Policy from
the Seventies to the Nineties: Continuity and Change, in Environmental Policy in the
1990s, supra note 67, at 3, 20-21 (discussing data and information gaps).
112 "Point" sources of water pollution are identifiable sources, such as effluent pipes
from factories or sewage treatment plants. "Nonpoint" emissions arise from more diffuse
sources, such as agricultural runoff, storm water overflows, and runoff from roads and
yards.
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than readily identifiable big factories. Other information gaps further
complicate water pollution control efforts. How quickly do various
pollutants break down? Which chemicals are bioaccumulative? Are
there interactions among pollutants that intensify the harm? How se-
rious are the impacts on human, animal, or plant life and health from
a particular set of exposures? How do we gauge the public health and
ecological impacts of water pollution when every chemical has a dis-
tinct dose-response function? Beyond the problems of identification
and measurement of harms, additional questions of data analysis
arise."13 Epidemiological and ecological analyses cannot provide pre-
cise answers about who will be harmed and by how much. Putting a
price on the harms inflicted is also not easy. Risk assessments and
cost-benefit analyses in this area are still rather crude, and the meth-
odologies for refining them are just beginning to be understood. 14
There are, moreover, a range of policy responses and technological
options from which environmental policymakers might choose, but
policymakers often lack the analytic foundation to make their choices
in a systematic, welfare-maximizing way.
Limited knowledge has resulted in a water pollution regulatory
structure that virtually ignores the harms from nonpoint sources such
as farming, road runoff, backyard pesticide and fertilizer applications,
and other hard-to-pin-down emitters. 115 The current regulatory ap-
proach lacks incentives for those who are closest to the harms-the
polluters and their victim-neighbors who share a particular water-
course-to develop the information needed for a more effective policy
response.
The technical complexity of addressing water pollution is height-
ened by a difficult collective action problem. Upstream jurisdictions
tend to pay little attention to the harms that their factories, farms, and
households cause downstream. 116 Unlike air pollution, where there
113 See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff et al., Acceptable Risk, in Foundations of Environmental
Law and Policy 80, 80-81 (Richard L. Revesz ed., 1997) (explaining that environmental
decisionmaking involves interrelated steps of risk assessment and assessment of other
data).
14 See James K. Hammitt, Data, Risk, and Science: Foundations for Analysis, in Think-
ing Ecologically, supra note 7, at 150, 152-57 (discussing different methods of environmen-
tal analysis and stating that "[wihatever analytic framework is employed, the complexity of
environmental issues and limitations in the science base ensure that the consequences of
alternative policies can be predicted only with substantial uncertainty").
115 See, e.g., Percival, supra note 108, at 1254 (describing difficulty of regulating
nonpoint sources).
116 See Thomas Bernauer, Managing International Rivers, in Global Governance:
Drawing Insights from the Environmental Experience 155, 162-65 (Oran R. Young ed.,
1997) (describing environmental conflicts that can emerge between upstream countries and
downstream countries).
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may be some reciprocity across jurisdictions when the wind blows
from the west on some days and from the east on other days, rivers
and streams always flow in one direction. Absent governmental inter-
vention at an overarching level, upstream polluters have limited in-
centives to pay attention to the complaints of downstream victims.
This pattern of costs and benefits translates into persistent structural
regulatory failure.
Efforts to address water pollution suffer, in addition, from signifi-
cant special interest manipulation. Polluters are generally organized
and relatively concentrated, while the victims of water pollution are
small, numerous, and hard to organize. This asymmetry of interest in
participating in the political process skews government decisions
about how much pollution control to require. 117 The failure to ad-
dress the agricultural sources of water pollution provides an especially
vivid example of public choice failure. Politically active and powerful,
farm interests have succeeded in shaping the political debate in ways
that have allowed farmers to duck responsibility for field runoff, irri-
gation return flows, and animal waste contamination.' 18
Once again, part of the perceived policy failure can be traced to
differences in values. Disputes persist over how much society benefits
from investments in eliminating pollutants from particular water
sources.119 Does "clean" water mean that it is swimmable? Fishable?
Drinkable? How clean a river should be is ultimately a political ques-
tion. Science and good technical analysis can guide us toward an an-
swer, but there is no algorithm that will yield a precise answer.
D. Acid Rain
The acidification of rivers, streams, lakes, and land from emis-
sions of sulfur dioxide and oxides of nitrogen represents a significant
problem in many parts of the world, including the United States. 120
Acid rain can be seen both as an example of a regulatory failure and
117 Clearly, many environmental issues remain unaddressed. The question is why any
have been taken on, given the asymmetries present. See Mashaw, supra note 33, at 33
(noting that "[a]ccording to interest group theory, groups representing such diffuse inter-
ests as those 'concerned about the environment' should never form," but that such groups
have nevertheless "grown, prospered, and had influence").
118 See C. Ford Runge, Environmental Protection from Farm to Market, in Thinking
Ecologically, supra note 7, at 200, 200-03 (arguing that little in way of environmental pro-
tection has been asked of America's farmers).
119 See, e.g., Jay Jochnowitz, GE, Feds Spar over Study of PCBs in River, Times Union
(Albany), Mar. 19, 1999, at B9 (describing EPA's dispute with General Electric Company
over extent of its responsibility for PCBs in Hudson River).
120 See Percival, supra note 108, at 820-25 (describing acid rain problem in United
States).
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as a case where the clarification of property rights has led to improved
regulatory results.
If every source of SO 2 and NO, could be identified, the loadings
from each source measured, and the downwind harm calculated with
some degree of precision, the information failures that make a pure
market-based response to acid rain impossible today could be over-
come. Of course, the vast dispersion of the harms across millions of
people and tens of millions of acres, both publicly and privately held,
makes the aggregation of harms in a coherent and low-cost manner
hard to achieve. Thus, some degree of governmental intervention to
address acid rain seems inescapable.
Beyond limited information, efforts to control acid rain have
been plagued by a number of other regulatory failures. Notably,
much of the harm travels beyond the jurisdictions where the emissions
are released (in large measure, coal-burning power plants and other
major coal-powered facilities in the Midwest). 21 This mismatch be-
tween the scope of the harms and the source of the emissions results
in serious structural failures in state-level environmental governance.
In particular, the midwestern states underattend to the acid rain prob-
lem, reflecting the fact that, from their own perspective, the costs of
mitigating the problem look high and the benefits to be obtained
within their own territory appear relatively low.
In the political arena, the acid rain generators have exercised in-
fluence to ensure that they are not burdened with heavy pollution
control costs. Indeed, the 1977 Clean Air Act promoted the burning
of high sulfur coal; this statute is now regarded as a paradigmatic ex-
ample of public choice failure.'22 The structure of the acid rain prob-
lem-with highly concentrated polluters and widely dispersed
victims-represents a classic example of the asymmetry of interests
that results in a high degree of susceptibility to public choice failure.
The Clean Air Act of 199012 considerably advanced the U.S. re-
sponse to acid rain with a sophisticated system of tradable emissions
allowances. By creating a market in pollution (and emission control),
121 See Paul Barton, Ill Winds or Smoke Screen? Northeast Blames Midwest for Its Air-
Pollution Woes, Cin. Enquirer, Jan. 19, 1998, at Al (describing friction between northeast-
em states and midwestern industry over acid rain and ozone transfer); see also Michael
Kranish, The Politics of Pollution, Boston Globe, Feb. 8,1998, Magazine, at 16, available in
1998 WL 9116401 (discussing effects of 1990 Clean Air Act on acid rainfall in New Eng-
land, caused largely by coal-burning power plants in Midwest).
122 See Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 61, at 59-78 (criticizing Clean Air Act of 1977).
But note that the Clean Air Act of 1990, amending the Clean Air Act of 1977, redirected
the regulatory focus. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-549, 104
Stat. 2399 (codified in scattered sections of 29, 42 U.S.C.).
123 Pub. L No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified in scattered sections of 29, 42 U.S.C.).
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the 1990 Clean Air Act established incentives for the generation of
information (particularly on the level of emissions and the costs of
control) on a highly disaggregated basis, making possible a much more
refined and cost-effective regulatory strategy and encouraging action
by those in a position to reduce SO 2 and NO. emissions at the lowest
cost. 24
While not a pure market response, the acid rain trading scheme
creates a hybrid structure that harnesses market forces in the service
of environmental gain. The ability to allocate responsibility for emis-
sions reductions, and to permit those who "overfulfill" their obliga-
tions to sell their excess permits to those who are having a hard time
reducing emissions at a reasonable cost, lowers the overall societal
cost of pollution control. The shift to a market approach appears to
have smoked out and eliminated some (but not all) of the special in-
terest distortion that plagued the 1977 Clean Air Act.125 In particular,
greater clarity about the sources of the acid rain problem has not only
helped to facilitate the creation of a market for rights, but also to
sharpen the political focus on those causing the harm, thereby making
it more difficult for a special interest-dominated outcome to emerge
from the political debate over how to respond to acid rain. Thus, the
information that became available has served to illuminate the policy
problem, and the transparency that resulted has been an important
factor in reducing the previously existing public choice failure.
Modem information technologies made this policy advance possi-
ble, improving the efficacy and efficiency of the regulatory system. In
particular, "real time" monitors (operating 365 days per year, 24 hours
a day) are now in the smokestacks of major power plants, allowing
regulators to track quite precisely the emissions that represent precur-
sors to acid rain.1 26 In effect, the data that the sensors provide ensure
that there is an adequate base of information to clarify who has prop-
erty rights in the acid rain marketplace, and to facilitate trading of
these rights.
124 See 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (1994); Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The Political
Economy of Market-Based Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, 41 J.L. &
Econ. 37, 40-43 (1998) (briefly explaining 1990 Clean Air Act); Adam J. Rosenberg, Note,
Emissions Credit Futures Contracts on the Chicago Board of Trade: Regional and Ra-
tional Challenges to the Right to Pollute, 13 Va. Envtl. L.J. 501, 503-10 (1994) (describing
pollution trading plan and its benefits).
125 The 1990 Act provides extra SO 2 allowances for the dirtiest midwestern utilities. See
42 U.S.C. § 7651c(e) (1994).
126 See Barbara Durr, Deals Set Up Trade in Pollution Permits, Fim. Tunes, May 13,
1992, at 4 (describing U.S. tradable permits system); John Medearis, Skies Finally Clearing
for Pollution Control Firm, L.A. Tunes, Oct. 24, 1989, at 9A (describing firm that manufac-
tures stack monitors).
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E. Fisheries
Fish stocks around the world are rapidly becoming depleted. Re-
cent studies estimate that nearly all of the world's fisheries are
overfished and at risk of collapse.127 Despite widespread media cov-
erage and extensive policy discussions about declining fisheries, inter-
national collaboration in response to this resource crisis has been
limited.
Fishing represents a classic open access resource management
problem; the failure to manage fisheries properly leads directly to a
tragedy of the commons."m Each fishing nation, indeed each fishing
boat, has an incentive to land as many fish as possible. But when
every country and every boat does the same, stocks are depleted, and
everyone's capacity to make a living diminishes. While mutual for-
bearance so as to ensure that fish stocks are maintained at a sustaina-
ble level makes eminent sense, the fear that others will not adhere to
the "collective action" bargain keeps each fisherman at work hauling
in as many fish as quickly as he or she can.
This policy failure can be directly traced to the lack of a function-
ing marketplace and confusion over who holds the relevant property
rights. If every fish were owned, the policy challenge would be greatly
diminished. Those holding rights to particular stocks would have an
incentive to manage them for long-term yield, or in environmental
language, sustainably. 129 Those taking fish without appropriate per-
mits would not only have violated the environmental rights of others,
but would have committed theft, opening themselves up to prosecu-
tion and to actions for damages. The difficulty of keeping track of
particular fish in the vast ocean makes a pure property rights regime
difficult to manage. Nevertheless, there is a growing capacity to track
schools of fish (via satellites), to calculate sustainable yields (based on
rapidly improving fish knowledge bases and modeling techniques),
and to monitor the number of fish landed (tracked by linked computer
databases).130 These gains in information technologies, when applied
127 See United Nations Food & Agric. Org., The State of World Fisheries and Aquacul-
ture 39-40 (1996) (analyzing exploitation of fisheries); Ann Platt McGinn, Promoting Sus-
tainable Fisheries, in State of the World 1998: A Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress
Toward a Sustainable Society 59,60-63 (Linda Starke ed., 1998) (describing crisis in world's
fisheries).
128 See Hardin, supra note 5, at 1245 (presenting overfishing of oceans as example of
"tragedy of the commons").
129 See World Comm'n on Env't and Dev., Our Common Future 265-69 (1937) (noting
importance of comprehensive fisheries management system among nations).
130 See Gareth Porter, Fisheries Subsidies, Overfishing and Trade 27 (United Nations
Environment Programme, Environment and Trade Series Paper #16, UNEPg90S, 1998)
(describing technological changes making it easier to track fish).
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in the fisheries context, could advance a market-based response to the
issue of fisheries depletion. Advanced information technologies make
possible not only the clarification, at least to some degree, of who
owns what property rights, but also facilitate the exchange of these
rights among fishermen.
Fisheries represent a classic case where an improved environmen-
tal outcome can be achieved by delineating rights. Such a regime,
however, still requires a degree of government support. In particular,
recognized authorities must calculate the level of fish that can be
taken, allocate the permits, enforce the limits established, and rein-
force the market that is created to trade the permits. This means that
governments must provide legal structures to ensure that those with
property rights are able to vindicate them, and that those who wish to
exchange rights can do so with confidence and at reasonable transac-
tion costs. A fully functioning tradable permits system in fish would
require international collaboration, both in the delineation and in the
enforcement of property rights. The multijurisdictional collective ac-
tion problem that would arise might be insurmountable. But the fish-
eries case is made easier by real reciprocity. The degree of
interdependence among fishermen, even across national boundaries,
is palpable.
Both Iceland and New Zealand have adopted systems of individ-
ual transferable quotas for selected species.' 3 1 In Quebec, lobster
stocks have revived after the introduction of a new permit system lim-
iting the number of licenses.132
As in other cases, the fisheries depletion challenge cannot be
completely resolved by well-informed environmental governance. Di-
vergent values cannot be escaped. Poor countries with many mouths
to feed may argue for taking more fish now, no matter that high yields
now put longer-term sustainability at risk.
131 See id. at 29 (noting that New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and Iceland have intro-
duced individual tradable quotas into some of their fisheries); Ian N. Clark et al., The
Development and Implementation of New Zealand's ITQ Management System, in Rights
Based Fishing 117, 130-40 (Philip A. Neher et al. eds., 1989) (describing New Zealand's
transferable quota system); Mark Trumbull, Fisheries Crisis Stretches Across the Globe,
Christian Sci. Monitor, July 6, 1994, at 8 (noting adoption of individual transferable quota
system for fishermen in Iceland and New Zealand).
132 See David Johnston, Fishing for a Fortune, Gazette (Montreal), Aug. 8, 1992, at B3
(describing increase in lobster stocks after government stopped issuing new commercial
fishing permits, so that permits were only bought and sold privately).
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F. Climate Change
Climate change represents the ultimate degree of complexity and
difficulty in environmental protection. 33 The harms-a buildup of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere potentially causing global warm-
ing, increased intensity of windstorms and other extreme weather
events, changes in rainfall patterns, and sea level rise--can be traced
to the activities of virtually every industrial facility, vehicle, and indi-
vidual on the planet. T3 This makes the information challenge in sort-
ing out who is responsible for the problem quite considerable indeed.
The additional fact that almost every person on the planet as well as
every ecological resource is susceptible to harm to one degree or an-
other adds to the policy challenge. Uncertainty over the exact mecha-
nism by which various types of emissions might lead to climate change
and an incomplete understanding of various countervailing forces
(such as clouds and ocean currents) that might mitigate a buildup of
greenhouse gases add to the causal complexity in this policy area. In
addition, a significant part of the harm appears likely to emerge only
at a relatively distant point in the future, multiplying the opportunities
for information-based policy failure.
Since it is difficult to determine the causes of the climate change
problem, who (and what) suffers harms, and the size of the losses to
the various actors, full reliance on a market-based exchange of prop-
erty rights in the climate change domain seems unlikely to be a suffi-
cient answer to this policy conundrum. 3 s In addition, because
greenhouse gas emissions blanket the earth and their impact may per-
sist in the atmosphere for centuries, there exists a significant issue of
omitted voices and intergenerational equity. 3 6
133 Former Undersecretary for Global Affairs Timothy Wirth referred to climate change
policy efforts as "the most difficult negotiation anyone has tried to do on a brand new
topic." Michael A. Lev, Forecast for Global-Warming Pact is Cloudy, Maybe Stormy, Chi.
Trib., Nov. 10, 1997, at 6; see also Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 Yale J. Int'l L 451,455-57,475-78 (1993)
(giving overview of complex issues surrounding regulatory response to climate change);
John W. Firor & Paul R. Portney, The Global Climate, in Current Issues in Natural Re-
source Policy 179, 199-207 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1982) (detailing complexities of climate
change issue).
134 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 1995: The Sci-
ence of Climate Change 59-60 (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 1996) (reviewing range of sources
of greenhouse gas emissions).
135 See, e.g., Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument
Choice in Legal Context, 108 Yale L.J. 677,798-800 (1999) (arguing that regulatory struc-
tures must be carefully tailored to fit the surrounding legal structures); Raymond J. Kopp
et al., Climate Change Policy After Kyoto, Resources, Winter 1998, at 4, 4-6 (describing
prospect for success of Kyoto Protocol).
136 See, e.g., James C. Wood, Intergenerational Equity and Climate Change, 8 Geo. Int'l
Envtl. L. Rev. 293, 327 (1996) (discussing intergenerational fairness in climate change).
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The broad (global) geographic spread of greenhouse gas emis-
sions also creates a massive degree of structural failure since regula-
tory authority lies at the national scale.137 From the perspective of
any single government, the benefits to be obtained by controlling
emissions within the jurisdiction look relatively small (the harm
spreads across the globe and over time), while the costs of controlling
those sources are very large (and fully borne within the jurisdiction).
Thus, from the point of view of a welfare-maximizing government, the
rational response to climate change appears to be to do nothing. The
only way to change the lose-lose Nash equilibrium 138 in this prisoners'
dilemma and to achieve constructive collective action is by making
clear that there is reciprocity.139 But while every nation faces a paral-
lel problem of emissions flowing across its borders from others, all
countries are not affected equally, nor do all governments place com-
parable value on addressing climate change.140
Within countries, moreover, differential impacts may also be
acute. Some very large and powerful industries (e.g., energy compa-
nies and car makers) might be significant losers if the world were to
commit to a dramatic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, espe-
cially if the mechanism adopted to achieve this reduction were a major
cutback in the burning of fossil fuels. Those who perceive themselves
as probable "losers" from action on climate change have thus been
motivated to fight in the political arena against more aggressive poli-
cies.141 In dealing with climate change, public choice failures seem
likely to compound the problems that arise from the number of scien-
137 See Cooper, supra note 48, at 41-49 (describing problem of global warming and role
played by decisionmakers at national levels).
138 The "Nash equilibrium" arises when the dominant strategy of each player in a two
person prisoners' dilemma game results in both parties ending up worse off than they need
to be. See generally John F. Nash, Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 18 Econometrica 155
(1950).
139 For discussion of the need for reciprocity to overcome the prisoners' dilemma, see
Clare Langley-Hawthorne, An International Market for Transferable Gas Emission Per-
mits to Promote Climate Change, 9 Fordham Envtl. L.J. 261, 297-98 (1998).
140 The countries of the South often have other more pressing priorities, and they object
to bearing the costs of what they perceive to be a problem created by the nations of the
North. See Daniel C. Esty & Robert Mendelsohn, Moving from National to International
Environmental Policy, 31 Pol'y Sci. 225,229-31 (1998) (highlighting complexity introduced
into international environmental policymaking by diverging values of different nations);
Tariq Osman Hyder, Climate Negotiations: The North/South Perspective, in Confronting
Climate Change: Risks, Implications and Responses 323, 325-26 (Irving M. Mintzer ed.,
1992) (describing impact that economic factors have on developing world's perspective on
climate change).
141 See Ross Gelbspan, The Heat Is On: The High Stakes Battle over Earth's
Threatened Climate 33-49 (1997) (documenting propaganda campaign waged by American
coal and oil companies against more aggressive climate change policies).
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tific uncertainties, a lack of a functioning marketplace, disagreement
over who holds property rights, and the significant obstacles posed by
the structure of the problem (concentrated costs and highly diffuse
benefits) and the lack of an adequate informational base on which to
construct a successful regulatory policy.
The climate change challenge also reflects a very significant de-
gree of values divergence. In some highly industrialized countries
(Scandinavia and other parts of northern Europe, for example) con-
cern about global warming, increased severity of storms, sea level rise,
and changes in rainfall patterns are taken very seriously, and there
appears to be some political will to implement policies that would re-
duce the risk of the harm.142 In other industrialized countries, such as
the United States, there does not yet appear to be a consensus on the
severity of the problem or on a serious policy response.143 In the de-
veloping world, most countries currently seem unwilling or unable to
address the problem. 44 For some nations, their disinterest reflects a
belief that the buildup of greenhouse gases represents a problem
caused by the industrialized countries and that efforts to address the
problem should lie with the developed world. For others, the lack of
interest in taking action arises from a judgment about the relative im-
portance of this environmental problem compared to other more
pressing issues such as the need to provide fresh drinking water to
burgeoning populations and to find ways to dispose of sewage and
toxic waste.145 In many of the mega-cities of the developing world,
acute harms from air pollution seem much more threatening to public
health than the long-term risks posed by climate change.
The fact that countries vary in their stages of development and
therefore see different priorities within the environmental domain and
across other policy issues adds to the difficulty of achieving an optimal
142 See Richard C. Hottelet, The Great Global Dilemma, Christian Sci. Monitor, July 2,
1997, at 19 (noting that several northern European nations voluntarily adopted stringent
controls on greenhouse gas emissions); Frank McDonald, Ireland Faces Tough Test After
Greenhouse Gas Deal, Irish Times, July 6,1998, at 4 (describing several European nations'
adoption of stricter emissions standards than provided for in Kyoto Agreement).
143 See Brad Knickerbocker, Global Warming Confusion, Christian Sei. Monitor, Sept.
24,1997, at 1 (describing public confusion in climate change debate); Victor Volland, Scien-
fists Oppose Quick-Fix for Global Warming, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Mar. 24,1999, at B3
(reporting that conference of climate change experts was uncertain about policy responses
to global warming).
144 See Paul G. Harris, Common but Differentiated Responsibility. The Kyoto Protocol
and the United States, 7 N.Y.U. Envtl. LJ. 27,30-35 (1999) (tracking positions of develop-
ing countries through history of international global climate change negotiations).
145 See Joyeeta Gupta, The Climate Change Convention and Developing Countries:
From Conflict to Consensus? 52-57 (1997) (explaining why climate change is not priority in
developing countries' domestic policies).
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policy response. But as with other issues analyzed above, while the
divergence in values cannot be gainsaid, the potential for effective
policy would be greatly enhanced if the more tractable information
shortcomings, structural failures, and public choice distortions were
addressed.
III
MARKET AND REGULATORY FAILURES IN PERSPECTIVE
In this Part, I trace the market and regulatory failures identified
in the examples above to the theoretical taxonomy developed in Part
I. I argue that strengthened markets in environmental rights could
reduce, but not eliminate, the burden on our regulatory system. I fur-
ther connect the existing weaknesses in park management, toxic waste
cleanup, water pollution control, acid rain abatement, fisheries man-
agement, and climate change policy to: (1) informational and admin-
istrative shortcomings, (2) jurisdictional mismatches resulting in
structural governance failures, and (3) public choice distortions. I also
weigh the relative importance of these various regulatory failures.
Data gaps and informational inadequacies appear to be the larg-
est source of regulatory failure and an area of immense potential for
improvement. Jurisdictional mismatches between the scope of public
goods and the reach of the governmental authorities are the source of
some further regulatory problems. These structural failures can often
be rectified relatively easily. Public choice failures are quite signifi-
cant and relatively difficult to fix but can also be diminished through
appropriate policy interventions.
A. Potential for Greater Reliance on Markets
It is axiomatic that where a functioning market in environmental
rights exists, regulatory intervention will not be necessary. 146 Given
the capacity to avoid all of the potential "downstream" failures-mis-
identification of problems, misunderstanding of causal linkages, poor
or sparse data, inadequate fate and transport analysis, weak epidemio-
logical or ecological studies, mistaken risk assessments, faulty policy
design, sloppy cost-benefit calculations, substandard implementation,
146 More accurately, intervention to achieve efficiency goals will not be needed. But this
is not to say that government will not be necessary. There would remain an important role
for government to play in providing a structure of law to support the exchange of property
rights and to ensure their vindication where one party has encroached on the environmen-
tal rights of another. Equity issues, moreover, may still justify government action. See,
e.g., Calabresi, supra note 29, at 1215 (arguing that distributional issues cannot be
avoided).
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and lax enforcement' 47-that occur once regulatory intervention is
deemed necessary, the returns from the creation of functioning mar-
kets in environmental property rights will be high.
As the examples in Part II make clear-from the policy tangle of
Superfund, to the near-total failure of our nonpoint source water pol-
lution control efforts, to the maddening complexity of climate
change-numerous obstacles hinder prospects for more expansive
market-based environmental protection. The lack of adequate infor-
mation needed to make the trading of environmental property rights
work stands out in particular. Perfect competition, economists tell us,
requires perfect information. Of course, perfect information is never
available, especially in the environmental realm which is so fraught
with uncertainty. But establishing an adequate base of information to
support some semblance of a market appears achievable in many in-
stances. Investments in better information on the sources, sizes, ef-
fects, and "prices" of environmental harms could dramatically expand
the number of situations where a property rights-based approach to
pollution control and resource management would be viable, and
would also make possible the broader application of market-oriented
regulatory tools.
Emphasizing better functioning environmental property rights
markets has many virtues.14  Notably, the information gathering and
processing burden, which currently falls on the government, can be
shifted, at least in part, to private parties. 149 As the acid rain problems
of the 1990 Clean Air Act demonstrate, creating markets in environ-
mental rights gives those who wish to buy or sell rights an incentive to
create the information needed to make the market work. If factories
were required to acquire the right to pollute from their victims, they
would have a very real incentive to analyze rigorously the harms they
147 See Esty, supra note 1, at 586-87 & n.48 (reviewing litany of potential regulatory
failures).
148 See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property:. Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales,
Emissions Trades and Ecosystems, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 129, 130-32 (1998) (reviewing benefits
of clear property rights).
149 Proposition 65, California's toxic chemicals notification law, effected a similar "bur-
den shift" to the polluters with significant success. See David Roe, An Incentive-Con-
scions Approach to Toxic Chemical Controls, 3 Econ. Dev. Q., 179, 179-82 (1989)
(describing legal strategy of California's Proposition 65 to use marketplace incentives to
achieve health goals). The value of imposing liability on the party with the best access to
risk information has long been understood. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability- One View of the Cathedral,
85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1096-97 (1972) (arguing that efficiency requires that costs be put on
party best able to make cost-benefit calculation); Steven Shavell, liability for Harm Versus
Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 357, 359 (1984) (arguing for liability rules rather
than regulation where private parties are in better position to assess risks than
government).
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were causing so as to avoid sky-high damage claims. Not only would
emitters have reasons to measure, analyze, and evaluate their impacts
on others, they would face a constant incentive to look for ways to
reduce their emissions and thus their exposure to claims for compen-
sation. Victims would also have an incentive to study the injuries they
were suffering so as to be able to calculate how much to demand in
compensation or in exchange for their rights.
Because the market tends to decentralize the information gather-
ing and valuation process, allowing for more finely tuned data collec-
tion and analysis, individuals would almost certainly be compensated
on a basis that more closely reflects their individual losses.
Nonbureaucratic information gathering might also prove to be
cheaper and more efficient.150 Just as businesses now exist to provide
consumers with advice on where to get the best deal on life insurance
or the lowest mortgage rates, one can also imagine that services would
emerge to help individuals to understand their potential claims. By
disseminating technical information, such as ecological and epidemio-
logical studies, these services might help to alleviate any diseconomies
of scale that would arise from decentralized data analysis.
Information is, in any case, becoming ever cheaper to gather, sift,
analyze, and use.' 5' The information gaps and failures that plague us
now will systematically (if slowly) recede over time.152 In effect, as
150 See E. Donald Elliott & Gail Charnley, Toward Bigger Bubbles: Why Interpollutant
and Interrisk Trading Are Good Ideas and How We Get There from Here, F. for Applied
Res. & Pub. Pol'y, Winter 1998, at 48 ("It is much more efficient for the government to set
up a market and police its operation than to plan and administer each individual
exchange.").
151 See Bill Gates et al., The Road Ahead 112-19 (1995) (describing recent and future
advances in information technology).
152 It is also worth noting that improved information technologies will generally reduce
the misuse of resources and the levels of waste and pollution. In effect, information and
advanced technologies substitute for scarce resources. For example, Monsanto's
bioengineered crops require less water and reduced pesticide applications thereby protect-
ing river water quantity and quality. See Robert Streyer, Cotton Firms Eyeing China, St.
Louis Post-Dispatch, June 2, 1996, at 1E (describing potential for Monsanto's
bioengineered seeds to increase yields in China). Similarly, Honeywell's computer-con-
trolled thermostats make possible more refined heating and cooling of homes (tracking
when people are not at home or sleeping), thereby reducing fossil fuel consumption and
the resulting pollution. See William R. Greer, The Electronic Home: A New Thermostat
You Set and Forget, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1986, at C2 (describing new technology that auto-
matically adjusts itself thereby saving energy). Computer-guided saws are allowing lumber
mills to get more board feet out of every tree that is cut, extending the reach of forest
resources. See Sue Doerfier, Erecting Walls: Preformed Panels Save Time, Waste in
Building, Ariz. Republic, July 11, 1998, at AH1 (describing efficiency of computer-oper-
ated saws). Likewise, the capacity to put onboard sensors in every automobile engine that
will trigger an alarm when the engine is out of tune and emissions exceed a certain toler-
ance (Mercedes has already developed such a capacity with the added feature of having the
sensor signal to the Mercedes dealer that a problem has arisen) allows us to substitute
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the cost of information falls, so do transaction costs, bringing us closer
to the day when a Coasian world of informed, low-cost exchanges of
fights becomes possible. 5 3 As a result, it may well be possible in the
not-too-distant future to substitute market controls for regulatory re-
strictions in response to an expanded number of pollution and re-
source management issues. 4 Where information failures can be
overcome, a shift toward market-based environmental protection thus
offers the promise of more efficient and equitable results. The poten-
tial gains across a variety of pollution control and resource manage-
ment challenges look significant, justifying considerable policy focus
on improved data, information, and analysis.
B. Regulatory Gains from Better Information
Rapidly advancing computer technologies and information sys-
tems, as well as general gains in ecological knowledge, make the possi-
bility of creating better functioning markets an important element of
any environmental policy future. Even if we do not advance far
enough in closing data gaps to move out of a regulatory mode alto-
gether and into pure market-based environmental controls, better in-
formation can reduce policy failures and permit a shift toward more
efficient and effective market mechanism-based regulatory tools.
For example, toxic waste sites would pose a less vexing policy
problem if the threatened harms from leaching chemicals were more
easily tracked and better quantified. Water pollution from dirt, oils,
pesticides, and fertilizers may all be traceable in the future, making
nonpoint source pollution control in rivers and streams much easier.
Advances based on improved data and information management
seem especially applicable to reversing the depletion of fisheries and
the sustainable management of other tangible natural resources.155
Dividing up a resource and giving the owners responsibility for man-
aging the assets relieves the government of a significant burden. Even
the challenge of mitigating climate change would undoubtedly be fa-
cilitated by information gains that clarified the size, scale, timing, and
origins of the problem. In particular, a much greater capacity to track
more nuanced pollution controls for today's rather crude environmental equipment. See
Stan Davis & Christopher Meyer, Blur. The Speed of Change in the Connected Economy
41-42 (1998) (describing Mercedes's development).
153 More realistically, we appear headed for a Calabresian world where the relative su-
periority of property rules over liability rules will emerge as transaction costs fall. See
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 149, at 1108-10 (asserting that liability rules apply when
valuation costs are too expensive).
154 See Rose, supra note 148, at 138 (arguing that costs of establishing property regimes
are not static but change with technology).
155 See supra Part ILE.
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who is emitting what and to estimate how much harm they are causing
and to whom would permit a more refined policy response.
From a regulatory reform perspective, improved analytic founda-
tions for policymaking are enormously important. While structural
failures and public choice failures are substantial, considerable evi-
dence suggests that the most sweeping and serious flaws in our envi-
ronmental decision processes arise from data gaps and technical
shortcomings. 56
Structural failures and public choice distortions may lead policy-
makers to set the wrong standard, spend too much or too little money
on a particular problem, or allow rents to accrue to special interests.
These problems, however, rarely cause policies to be directionally
wrong. Information errors do.157 To the extent that data and techni-
cal problems can lead to a focus on the wrong issues or to massive
miscalculations as to the size, scope, and magnitude of a harm, they
have the capacity to cause much greater distortions to the environ-
mental policy outcome than other failures. Information errors, more-
over, have a tendency to cascade through the regulatory system
causing errors at each downstream stage of the decision process. The
accumulation of miscalculations and other mistakes multiplies over
time. The potential gain from investing in improving our information
and knowledge base in the environmental policy process is therefore
significant. 158
Better information and the capacity to manipulate vast quantities
of data into usable knowledge is possible in many areas. Scientific
advances have started to give us a much clearer picture of the fate and
transport of pollution. Advances in sensors, and thus the capacity to
detect and trace emissions, will increasingly make the causal links be-
tween sources and harms easier to track. 159 Vastly expanded com-
puter computational capacity and refined modeling and simulation
techniques (such as neural net analysis) will sharpen understanding of
156 See Terry Davies, Critically Evaluating America's Pollution Control System, Re-
sources, Winter 1998, at 17 (reviewing shortcomings in U.S. pollution control policy). See
generally Economic Analyses at EPA: Assessing Regulatory Impact (Richard D. Morgen-
stern ed., 1997) (providing case studies showing pervasiveness of data gaps).
157 See Davies & Mazurek, supra note 6, at 29-30, 105, 112-21 (chronicling technical
regulatory failures in many environmental areas); Landy et al., supra note 35, at 313 (dis-
cussing EPA technical regulatory failures).
158 See Farber, supra note 13, at 5-6 (reviewing uncertainties that make good environ-
mental policymaking difficult).
159 See, e.g., Martha Brannigan, CAT Scan May Soon "Map" Air Pollution, wall St. J.,
Nov. 10, 1994, at B7 (describing use of CAT scan technology to track pollution); Scientific
Sleuths Hope to Track Pollutants to Their Sources, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1996, at 18 (describ-
ing plan by MIT researchers to track pollutants by unique molecular characteristics).
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pollution impacts. These analytic gains have application as part of the
response to many environmental problems.
Even where a complete shift to a full-scale property rights-based
environmental protection system would not be feasible or advisable,
investments in improved data and information will yield dividends.
Indeed, better information would also go a long way toward mitigat-
ing existing regulatory failures, which would help to facilitate a shift
toward more efficient and effective incentive-based policy interven-
tions. This logic argues for putting better data, knowledge, and ana-
lytic rigor at the center of the environmental policy agenda.
Controversies over park management, Superfund cleanups, water pol-
lution control, acid rain, fisheries, and climate change could all be re-
duced through better information and more solid analytic foundations
for policymaking.
C. Overcoming Structural Failures
Structural failures that arise when the scope of the regulating ju-
risdiction does not match the scale of an environmental problem have
received a great deal of attention in recent environmental policy de-
bates. 160 And some number of regulatory failures can be traced to
jurisdictional mismatches. There is no doubt, for example, that part of
the problem with the Superfund program derives from trying to an-
swer the question of "how clean is clean?" at the federal rather than
the local level. Likewise, progress on acid rain would likely never
have been made as long as the issue were left to state level initiative;
the overarching federal perspective (and even an international view-
point) was needed to provoke action.
Some observers have argued that the U.S. environmental policy
structure has become systematically overcentralized. 161 The call for a
sweeping presumption for devolution cannot, however, be justified.162
In fact, some current policy failures, such as climate change, reflect
problems where the scope of the harm exceeds the reach of the ex-
isting regulatory jurisdictions. The logic of multi-tier governance ap-
pears to have carried the day.163
160 See supra note I (reviewing recent environmental federalism debate).
161 See Gingrich, supra note 4, at 101-08, 193-200 (arguing that government generally
and environmental regulation in particular are too centralized); Revesz, supra note 1, at
1244-47 (arguing that federal environmental regulation is often unjustified).
162 See Charles E. David & James P. Lester, Federalism and Environmental Policy, in
Environmental Politics and Policy: Theories and Evidence 57, 57-59 (James P. Lester ed.,
1989) (discussing problems with decentralization).
163 See Esty, supra note 1, at 652 ("[TIhe diversity of environmental problems we face
demands a range of regulatory response strategies and levels of governmental activity.");
Wallace E. Oates, Thinking About Environmental Federalism, Resources, Winter 1998, at
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Moreover, while much ink has been spilled in the debate over
environmental federalism, there is little evidence that violations of the
"matching principle" and regulation at the wrong scale represent any-
thing other than a small part of the environmental policy problem. As
a theoretical matter, where internalities exist, they often can be rela-
tively easily addressed through partial devolution of decisionmaking.
In practice, such an allocation (or reallocation) of primary regulatory
responsibility has occurred in several areas. Parks, for example, come
in various sizes, corresponding to various needs. Few tennis courts are
managed at the state or federal level; supervision is, quite properly,
lodged at the local level. The failure to take local information seri-
ously in the context of Superfund cleanups has been in part addressed
by the EPA's emphasis on "place-based" cleanup standards. 164 The
control over drinking water programs has similarly shifted toward
state and local officials.' 65
It must not be forgotten that many decisions that are best made
at the local or state level will benefit from some information, espe-
cially technical data, that is more efficiently gathered at a national
level. 166 In the Superfund context, for instance, the need for some
understanding of how much harm can be anticipated from particular
chemicals at various levels of concentration represents a scientific
question susceptible to significant economies of scale. The technical
dimension of optimal regulation and the need to ground all policy
choices on a sound analytic foundation argues for an ongoing federal
role.167 The shape of this support for local and state decisionmaking
14 ("[T]here are important roles for nearly all levels of government in environmental pro-
tection."); Revesz, supra note 35, at 2346 (acknowledging need for federal as well as state
regulation).
164 See Pamela Hill, Emerging Policy and Legal Directions at EPA, 33 New Eng. L. Rev.
625, 627-32 (1999) (describing EPA's plans for increased public involvement through
"place-based" regulation).
165 More broadly, structural failures arising from intemalities do not appear to be a
serious source of environmental policy failure. In the few cases where centralized authori-
ties were recognized to have been dictating policy on local-scale issues to state or local
officials, such as EPA's municipal landfill rules under RCRA and the drinking water stan-
dards under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), the errors have been corrected. See
Denise Scheberle, Federalism and Environmental Policy: Trust and the Politics of Imple-
mentation 44-84 (1997) (describing history and implementation of programs for safe drink-
ing water); William E. Cox, Evolution of the Safe Drinking Water Act: A Search for
Effective Quality Assurance Strategies and Workable Concepts of Federalism, 21 Win. &
Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 69, 134-36 (1997) (describing increased flexibility and deci-
sionmaking power accorded to states under 1996 Amendments to SDWA).
166 See Esty, supra note 1, at 614-17 (arguing that much of data necessary for optimal
regulation is most effectively gained centrally).
167 See id. at 622-23 (proposing creation of "National Institute for the Environment" to
act as centralized data gathering and analysis mechanism).
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should, however, be refined. A National Institute for the Environ-
ment that can answer these sorts of questions might better facilitate
devolved decisionmaking than the current EPA structure of policy
control.168
Interjurisdictional externalities represent a more serious form of
structural failure from both a theoretical and empirical perspective.
Wherever a pollution harm or resource management problem spills
across political boundaries, the risk of a governance failure rises.
Suboptimal results will persist if the structure and nature of the partic-
ular problem promote free riding, holdouts, or other strategic behav-
ior. Where reciprocity exists between or among jurisdictions and the
number of parties involved is relatively low (and thus the transaction
costs of working out a collaborative arrangement are not too high),
there is a prospect of overcoming the prisoners' dilemma dynamic and
developing a mechanism to internalize the externalities and achieve a
relatively efficient environmental result. In a number of watersheds,
for example, multiple jurisdictions have agreed on pollution reduction
programs. 16 9
For environmental problems that are confined to a single national
jurisdiction, structural failure is not a particularly intractable issue.
Divergent interests (a lack of reciprocity) or values, bargaining com-
plexities, and a lack of information will make cooperation difficult, but
not impossible.
Successful collaboration becomes more remote when multiple na-
tions are involved, due to the differences in culture, traditions, geogra-
phy, preferences, and values that must be taken into account.
Nevertheless, where countries share borders there may be some de-
gree of recognized interdependence that will make possible negoti-
ated outcomes on a reasonably fair and efficient basis.170 The 1990
U.S.-Canada acid rain treaty 71 demonstrates this potential.
As a simple rule, the harder a problem is to see and the broader
the spread of the harm across space or time, the more likely it is that
168 See Committee for the Natl Inst. for the Env't, A Proposal for a National Institute
for the Environment: Need, Rationale, and Structure 27-29 (1993) (explaining need for
new environmental agency).
169 See generally Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons
from the Clean Air Act, 23 Harv. Envtl. L Rev. 203,204-05 (1999) (describing efforts to
coordinate watershed regulation between jurisdictions).
170 See Dua & Esty, supra note 44, at 95-117 (arguing for regional environmental pro-
grams); Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Pro-
tection (Peter M. Haas et al. eds., 1993) (giving examples of successful regional
collaboration); Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for
Collective Action 210-14 (1990) (discussing ways to overcome collective action problem in
international domain).
171 Agreement on Air Quality, Mar. 13, 1991, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S. No. 11783.
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externalities will not be internalized and that an appropriate degree of
collective action will not be achieved. 172 Climate change, with its
worldwide scope and multicentury time horizon, represents the outer
pole on this scale. The ongoing difficulties in implementing the Kyoto
Protocol seem to corroborate this theoretical prediction.
TABLE 2
POLLUTION ABATEMENT CURVES173
Population without safe water
100.
o. 1 ! 1,10100 1,00 ,0 le0:O0





0 4,060 7, 0 11,




160 1,0cp 0 10n, 100,000
Per capita Income (dollars, log scale)
Population without sanitation
Per capita income (dollars, log scale)




0 5,500 11, 00 17, 00
Per caplta Income (dollars)
In some transboundary cases, collaborative agreements can be
reached, mitigating the difficulty of a mismatch between the scope of
the environmental issue and the jurisdiction of the regulating author-
172 See Dua & Esty, supra note 44, at 72-77 (discussing how transboundary harms lead
to structural failures).
173 Reprinted from id. at 74.
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ity, if not eliminating it altogether. 174 Although compliance is not per-
fect, the Montreal Protocol has slowed the growth rates of ozone-
depleting chemicals, providing hope that ozone levels will recover in
the next century. 175 In many circumstances, therefore, the question of
who will regulate appears to be overemphasized. Questions about
how to approach difficult environmental policy decisions also matter.
D. Public Choice Failures
Scholars broadly recognize the capacity of special interests to
shape outcomes through campaign contributions, preferred access to
key decisionmakers, and investments in self-serving "scientific" analy-
sis and other technical information aimed at influencing political de-
bates.' 76 Asymmetries of interest and activity in the political realm
between concentrated and organized polluters and the dispersed and
difficult-to-organize general public are inherent in the environmental
domain. 77
Public choice failures are present in almost all environmental pol-
icy processes. Persistent intra-jurisdictional uninternalized externali-
ties, including nonpoint source water pollution or acid rain (prior to
the 1990 Clean Air Act), can often be traced to asymmetries in the
political process between concentrated and particularized interests
and the diffuse general public interest.178 Special interests seem par-
ticularly adept at winning preferential treatment in situations in which
other failures, especially information gaps, make the policy picture
174 See generally Engaging Countries, supra note 37 (discussing international environ-
mental collaboration efforts).
175 See Duncan Brack, International Trade and the Montreal Protocol 26-37 (1996) (dis-
cussing relative success of global agreement to protect ozone layer).
176 Some policy interventions aim to shift the overall level of societal commitment to
environmental protection. In other cases, rent seeking will motivate special interest lobby-
ig and the policy intervention will advance the interests of a particular region, industry, or
firm. See Keohane et al., supra note 58, at 348-51 (discussing circumstances under which
firms prefer regulation); Pashigian, supra note 58 (arguing that self-interest explains re-
gional differences in supporting policy to prevent environmental degradation).
177 See Ackerman, supra note 63, at 723-26 (discussing advantages concentrated inter-
ests have over diffuse ones); Roger G. Noll, Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Reg-
ulation, in 2 Handbook of Industrial Organization 1253, 1265 (Richard Schmalensee &
Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) (examining organized political participation and identif)ing
implication that heterogeneous groups with relatively small per capita stakes are disadvan-
taged relative to small, homogeneous groups with large per capita stakes).
178 See J. Clarence Davies III, The Politics of Pollution 96-97 (1970) (reviewing influ-
ence of special interest groups on U.S. environmental policy); Richard B. Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L Rev. 1667, 16S4-87, 1713-15(1975) (explaining imbalance between industry orientation and protection of general pub-
lic interests in agency policies); Peter H. Schuck, The Politics of Regulation, 90 Yale L.J.
702, 703 (1981) (book review) (describing ability of firms to manipulate legislative process
to disadvantage of consumers).
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murky. The public choice failures stymieing Superfund reform (exac-
erbated by significant information failures) and complicating climate
change policymaking (marked by serious structural and information
hurdles) illustrate this phenomenon.
Where governments lack democratic foundations, massive envi-
ronmental policy failures are more likely to occur. China's severe air
pollution, including notable problems with acid rain, can be seen, at
least in part, as a function of a political system that gives little weight
to the will of the people. 179 The political processes in more demo-
cratic nations are sometimes not much better. Louisiana's eagerness
to bring chemical plants to the banks of the Mississippi River from
Baton Rouge to New Orleans, despite the threats of toxic exposure
and the expressed contrary wishes of those who live most immediately
adjacent to the facilities in "Cancer Alley,"'180 represents a similar
form of public choice failure.
Theoretical analysis and empirical studies suggest that public
choice failures are a major reason why environmental policies un-
derperform.18' Almost any government action creates winners and
losers, and contending interests will vie to end up on the positive side
of the ledger. But the complexity and opacity of many environmental
issues and the public's difficulty in perceiving its own interest make
the risk of special interest manipulation much more severe in the envi-
ronmental realm than in other fields of regulation or government ac-
tivity. 18 2 Simply put, the average citizen knows if he or she is getting
adequate roads or schools and even has a sense of whether the gov-
ernment regulation of banks seems appropriate. In many environ-
mental circumstances, however, no comparable basis for judging the
179 See William P. Alford & Yuanyuan Shen, Limits of the Law in Addressing China's
Environmental Dilemma, 16 Stan. Envtl. LJ. 125, 145-48 (1997) (arguing that China could
more effectively protect environment by increasing role of citizenry in government).
180 See Beverly H. Wright et al., Coping with Poisons in Cancer Alley, in Unequal Pro-
tection: Environmental Justice and Communities of Color 110, 112-20 (Robert D. Bullard
ed., 1994) (describing threat of toxins in "Cancer Alley"). See generally Eileen Gauna,
The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the Paradigm Paradox, 17 Stan.
Envtl. LJ. 3 (1998) (discussing failure of environmental decisionmaking to take into ac-
count those communities that are most at risk from environmental dangers).
181 See, e.g., Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 61, at 54-58 (describing congressional
mishandling of environmental issues); Environmental Politics, supra note 59 (presenting
seven case studies that show that purpose and effect of environmental policy often serve
narrow political and economic objectives rather than environmental objectives); Peter P.
Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competi-
tion Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. and Yale J. on Reg.
67, 100-03 (Symposium Issue 1996) (arguing that influence of interest groups and other
public choice failures prevent optimal environmental regulation).
182 See Esty, supra note 1, at 631-32 (noting invisibility, technical intensity, and time lags
of many environmental harms).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 74:14951548
HeinOnline -- 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1548 1999
December 1999] TOWARD OPTIMAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 1549
adequacy of outcomes exists. Does the government standard for resi-
due of the pesticide allidochlor on corn at a level of 0.05 parts per
million protect human health? Are particulate levels in the air of 15
micrograms per cubic meter safe? Should radionuclides in drinking
water be eliminated? The public has no way to judge. In this non-
transparent world, the threats of special interest manipulation and
public choice failures are very real and often very large.
IV
OPmAL ENVIRONMENTAL GovERNANcE STRATEGIES
Environmental governance structures and programs should miti-
gate and minimize both market and regulatory failures and, in so do-
ing, maximize the social welfare gains from governmental intervention
in the environmental domain. A number of core strategies can be
identified as part of the process of optimizing environmental results:
(1) enhancing the market for environmental rights; (2) establishing a
multi-tier governance structure that permits regulation to occur at a
level that most closely matches the Optimal Environmental Area
(OEA); 83 (3) enriching the intellectual underpinnings for policymak-
ing through greater transparency and a mix of regulatory competition
as well as cooperation; and (4) facilitating a balance between public
engagement in environmental decisionmaking and delegation of such
decisionimaking to experts.
Each of these core strategies addresses one or more of the
sources of environmental policy failure identified above. The argu-
ment for enhanced markets goes straight to the failures that plague
efforts to facilitate the exchange of environmental rights. Identifying
the OEA for regulation attempts to mitigate structural failures that
arise when the regulator's jurisdiction does not encompass all of the
cost bearers or beneficiaries of governmental intervention. A more
refined mix of competition and cooperation among environmental
policy actors and a more transparent policy process will bolster efforts
to address both information shortcomings and public choice failures.
A combined strategy of targeted public engagement in and delegation
of decisionmaking to designated experts on technical issues will help
to overcome the problems that arise from uninformed public decision-
making. A greater emphasis on transparency and invigorated public
oversight of the policy process would also help to reveal special inter-
est manipulation.
183 The Optimal Environmental Area (OEA) is the area in which a regulator's jurisdic-
tion encompasses all of the cost bearers and beneficiaries of governmental intervention.
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A. Market Enhancement
Market exchanges of environmental fights are constrained in
some circumstances by the lack of an appropriate legal regime to clar-
ify the ownership of environmental rights, prevent theft of or infringe-
ment on privately held resources, and facilitate the buying and selling
of these rights.' 84 Efforts to make the market in environmental rights
more robust-thereby obviating the need for regulation or, at least,
facilitating a shift toward market-based regulatory strategies-offer
great promise. Strengthening the market will often entail reinforcing
the rule of law and sometimes even creating a functioning legal
system.
Within the United States, we take for granted the presence of
legal processes and rules. Structures exist at the local, state, and fed-
eral levels to provide adjudication of disputes, including ones over
property rights. s85 But mechanisms aimed at specific environmental
issues and the property rights that underlie them often need to be
developed. For instance, it was the Chicago Board of Trade that actu-
ally made the 1990 Clean Air Act's emissions allowance trading sys-
tem work by launching a trading pit in acid rain allowances.18 6 In
many countries and in the international environmental domain, how-
ever, the legal rules and procedures needed to support markets and to
protect property rights are not well developed.
Certain issues and problems will be more susceptible to a rights-
based response than others. Property rights seem easier to clarify, for
instance, when the issue involves management of a tangible resource
and when the number of parties involved in the division of the re-
source is small.' 87 Organizing a sign-up system for tennis court time in
a municipal park is generally not problematic. The more ethereal the
resource in question, the more difficult it will be to set up a property
rights regime. Thus, while some success has been achieved in dividing
up rights to fish, there has been great difficulty in developing a prop-
184 See generally Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance
of Property Rules, 106 Yale LJ. 2091, 2096-2105 (1997) (explaining advantages of property
regime in protecting entitlements). But cf. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property
Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 732-37 (1996)
(explaining why liability rules may be superior to property rules).
185 See, e.g., John J. Cound et al., Civil Procedure: Cases and Materials 4-6 (7th ed.
1997) (describing various levels of jurisdiction in U.S. court system).
186 See Robert Stavins & Bradley Whitehead, Market-Based Environmental Policies, in
Thinking Ecologically, supra note 7, at 105, 107-08 (describing structure of acid rain allow-
ance trading system).
187 The rule of "small numbers" has long been understood. See R.H. Coase, The Prob-
lem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 2-8 (1960) (arguing that regardless of whether pol-
luters or pollutees hold property rights, an efficient level of emissions can be negotiated if
transaction costs are low).
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erty rights response to climate change, which would entail entitle-
ments to the hard-to-see, hard-to-divide-up atmosphere. Likevise,
the larger the number of people who are involved, the more difficult
property rights allocation and enforcement become. Fisheries agree-
ments within one country or among neighboring countries, therefore,
are easier to negotiate and to sustain than fights allocations in the
open ocean. Even when a resource cannot easily be segregated into
property entitlements, an element of the problem is often susceptible
to a property rights enhancement. Rights to the air are not easily de-
marcated and would be hard to enforce, but rights to emit certain
amounts of SO2 and NO. can be delimited and controlled.
Hope for better results in response to a range of persistent envi-
ronmental problems at the local, state, national, and international
levels depends on enhancing the functioning of markets and harnes-
sing market forces to environmental goals. For instance, lifting the
liability cloud that hangs over the titles of abandoned toxic waste sites
by reforming the Superfund program represents the most critical step
that could be taken to address the brownfields problem.18s Similarly,
privately funded open space, purchased in the private marketplace
and protected through local land trusts, represents the cutting edge of
progress in conservation across the United States.1 9
Even where a fully functioning market is not likely to evolve any-
time soon, improved environmental results can be obtained by en-
hancing market forces to some degree. Nonpoint source pollution of
rivers, for instance, would get more attention if "loadings" al-
lowances 90 were issued for pesticides and fertilizers and if responsi-
bilities for reducing these pollutants were made clear (i.e., if who
holds the property rights were spelled out).191 Likewise, while the at-
mosphere cannot be privatized (nor would we want it to be), green-
house gas emissions can be made a tradable item. Climate change
policy progress would be much more likely if governments established
188 See supra Part II.B.
189 See John A. McVickar, Land Trusts: A Growing Conservation Institution, 21 Vt.
BJ. & L. Dig. 33 (1995) (describing history and growing importance of land trusts for
conservation purposes).
190 A "loadings" allowance system would allocate a total amount of pollution permitted
to be discharged and then allow the parties holding the allowances to buy and sell the right
to discharge.
191 For a discussion of nonpoint source trading, see generally Esther Bartfeld, Point-
Nonpoint Source Trading- Looking Beyond Potential Cost Savings, 23 EnvtL L 43, 82-89
(1993). The article also discusses two point-nonpoint emissions trading programs on the
Dillon River in Colorado and the Tar-Pamlico River Basin in North Carolina. See id. at
83-89.
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a system of property rights and developed and enforced a market to
permit exchange of these rights.
The difficulty of establishing and protecting property rights in the
international domain is, of course, more difficult than within a single
nation. China currently pours acid rain into Japan and Korea with
impunity.192 Absent a structure to enforce their right not to be acidi-
fied, Japan and Korea are reduced to pleading with China for better
results or to donating emissions control equipment to Chinese power-
plants and other facilities. 193 Likewise, an international response to
fisheries depletion has been hindered by a lack of market structures to
facilitate the exchange of fish landing rights. In countries that have
used these mechanisms, such as Iceland and New Zealand, there has
been progress in restoring fish stocks to sustainable levels.194 Devel-
oping these structures at the international level will require a stronger
international environmental regime.195
Differences in values, a lack of trust, and refusals to acknowledge
a softening of national sovereignty also complicate the task of sharing
natural resources on an international scale.196 Rules that are widely
accepted domestically break down in their international application.
For example, the concept of cost internalization as embodied in the
Polluter Pays Principle' 97-the central rule of domestic environmental
regimes the world over-gets little respect in the international
realm. 98 Perhaps the Polluter Pays Principle, which derives from the
property rights protections of nuisance law, has never taken root in
192 See Shigenori Matsuura, China's Air Pollution and Japan's Response to It, 7 Int'l
Envtl. Aff. 235, 235 (1995) (noting that China is responsible for half of acid rain-causing
pollution in Japan).
193 See Peter Evans, Japan's Green Aid, 21 China Bus. Rev. 39, 40-43 (1994) (detailing
Japan's pollution control assistance to China).
194 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
195 See Daniel C. Esty, The Case for a Global Environmental Organization, in Manag-
ing the World Economy: Fifty Years After Bretton Woods 287, 290-93 (Peter B. Kenen
ed., 1994) (spelling out weaknesses in existing international environmental regime).
196 See Andrew Hurrell & Benedict Kingsbury, The International Politics of the Envi-
ronment: An Introduction, in The International Politics of the Environment: Actors, In-
terests and Institutions 1, 6-8, 22-23 (Andrew Hurrell & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 1992)
(discussing obstacles that international system poses to environmental management and
highlighting limited ability of agreements to overcome those obstacles).
197 Developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the
Polluter Pays Principle is widely cited as a core element of sound environmental policy.
See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5 (1992) (stating that na-
tional authorities should promote internalization of environmental costs, taking into ac-
count principle that polluter should bear cost of pollution).
198 See Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environ-
mental Law, 3 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 105, 110-11 (1995) (observing that transboundary
pollution generally goes unconstrained in international realm). But see Trail Smelter Case,
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the international domain because there has been no basic interna-
tional legal structure nor any system of enforcement. In a world with-
out law, behavior tends to degrade toward a Hobbesian principle of
"might makes right." Further, countries historically have considered
transboundary environmental harms not to be very significant and
therefore not worth addressing. Alternatively, countries may have
perceived transboundary environmental harms to be roughly recipro-
cal, making investment in a system of intervention and allocation of
responsibilities not worth the cost.199 Finally, the countries that have
had the greatest capacity to shape international environmental norms,
notably the United States, have concluded that their own self-interest
was best served by weak adherence to the Polluter Pays Principle and
an operative legal rule that lets pollution harms be borne by those
upon whom they fall.
The lack of international environmental legal structures not only
makes the ownership and enforcement of property rights difficult but
also limits the opportunities for market-based exchanges of these
rights. For example, policy analysts have argued, nearly unanimously,
that the problem of climate change would benefit from an emissions
trading system, similar to that used within the United States to reduce
acid rain.200 But the inadequate international environmental legal
structure centered on the dysfunctional United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) makes setting up such a trading mechanism a
difficult taskZ0 Discussions have evolved toward a Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism, which would, in effect, allow a transfer of rights and
obligations between developed and developing countries in return for
financial and technical rewards.20o Other climate change analysts en-
vision a broader market for emissions trading.20 3 Whatever the form
3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1933 (1941) (describing international arbitration award resulting in en-
forcement of Polluter Pays Principle).
199 See Rose, supra note 5, at 9, 16-18 (reviewing circumstances that might make "do-
nothing" or nonintervention strategy preferred option).
200 See supra Part I.D.
201 See Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 Am.
J. Int'l L. 259, 263 (1992) (noting that United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
has provided no effective legal framework for dealing with environmental degradation).
See generally Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATrI: Trade, Environment, and the Future
77-78 (1994) (reviewing reasons for weakness of international environmental regime):
Mark Allan Gray, The United Nations Environment Programme: An Assessment, 20
Envtl. L. 291, 297-315 (1990) (evaluating UNEP's limitations and contributions).
202 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, opened for signature Mar. 16, 1998, art. 3(12), 37 I.LM. 22, 32-43.
203 See Robert NV. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regula-
tion: A New Era from an Old Idea? 18 Ecology L.Q. 1, 8-10 (1991) (discussing allocative
efficiencies of unregulated trade in permits); Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener,
The Comprehensive Approach to Global Climate Policy: Issues of Design and Practicality,
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greenhouse gas emissions allowance trading takes, investments will
have to be made in designing structures to facilitate exchanges and
setting up mechanisms to enforce the deals that get done.2°4
B. Multi-tier Governance and Optimal Environmental Areas
The economic theory underlying the need for a "matching princi-
ple" between the scope of the regulatory jurisdiction and the physical
footprint of the public good or problem at hand is well established.20
The fact that environmental protection involves problems at various
levels makes necessary a multi-tier regulatory structure with appropri-
ate entities at the local, state, federal, and international levels.2 0 6 As
noted earlier,20 7 to be structurally sound and to deliver efficient (and
fair) results, the regulatory calculus must include all of the potential
cost bearers and beneficiaries of governmental intervention (or nonin-
tervention). For each particular issue there exists an OEA that corre-
sponds to the geographic scope of the costs and benefits of the public
good or policy at hand.20 8 Primary regulatory responsibility should be
assigned to authorities at the level that most closely corresponds to
this OEA.
Allocating responsibility over environmental issues to the appro-
priate jurisdictional level of government means, primarily, identifying
the physical scope of the harm or resource in question and, seconda-
rily, determining if administrative efficiency or economic and psycho-
logical spillovers justify governmental action at another scale. The
OEA for the governance of a particular problem will vary from a
highly localized zone to the entire planet. When the impacts are geo-
9 Ariz. J. Int'l Comp. L. 83, 103-04 (1992) (arguing that, for optimal results, businesses or
governments should be allowed to invest in greenhouse gas reduction anywhere in world).
204 See Daniel C. Esty, Breaking Protocol, World Link, Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 10, 11 (spell-
ing out international structure and procedures required to make greenhouse gas emissions
control system work).
205 See Baumol & Oates, Theory, supra note 5, at 158 (arguing that, from purely eco-
nomic view, standards for pollution that does not travel across jurisdictions should be set
locally); Olson, supra note 87, at 480-83 (discussing economic logic for avoiding externali-
ties and internalities).
206 The need to focus on relative institutional competence is well understood. See
Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making
and Application of Law 102-07 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)
(arguing that purpose of institutional procedures is to facilitate and advance community
support in development of citizens); see also Esty, supra note 1, at 652-53 (summarizing
argument for multi-tier structure of environmental governance).
207 See supra note 88.
208 The concept of an OEA builds on the theoretical work done in a parallel policy area
to develop "optimum currency areas." See Robert Mundell, A Theory of Optimum Cur-
rency Areas, 51 Am. Econ. Rev. 657, 660-64 (1961) (articulating theoretical bases for iden-
tifying optimal currency area).
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graphically concentrated, such as the management of a small water-
shed, regulation should be left to local or state officials. 209 Larger-
scale problems, such as acid rain, must be addressed by regional or
federal authorities to ensure a structurally sound regulatory decision
process. Problems of worldwide scope, such as the potential for cli-
mate change, must be addressed at the global scale.210
One can argue that the lack of a functioning governance structure
at the global scale makes a worldwide climate change policy response
infeasible. Indeed, there are reasons to expect higher transaction
costs at the international scale.21' Falling back to national-scale inter-
vention, however, invites free riding, holdouts, and inefficient spend-
ing of limited resources-and thus structural regulatory failure. At
least from a theoretical viewpoint, inherently global problems demand
concerted worldwide action.
Defining the OEA is necessary not only to avoid structural fail-
ures of the regulatory regime arising from externalities but also to mit-
igate the welfare losses caused by the internalities that arise when the
regulating jurisdiction is too large. To the extent that the environmen-
tal decisionmaking is too centralized, resulting in decisions that are
suboptimal for a subset of the jurisdiction, the policy response should
be to heed the OEA and reassign primary regulatory responsibility.
The disconnect between the will of the subset of the population and
the larger-scale jurisdiction that is making decisions against this will
can be eliminated by identifying a smaller-scale decisionmaking body
to take over the environmental policy problem.
The opportunity for partial devolution is especially significant in
the environmental realm. In fact, in many cases, it will make sense to
divide regulatory responsibilities, which entail a number of functions,
between or among levels of government. Environmental efforts
209 See William Goldfarb, Watershed Management: Slogan or Solution?, 21 B.C. Envtl.
Aff. L Rev. 483, 497-504 (1994) (arguing that optimal watershed management must give
regulatory authority to proper level of government); William E. Taylor & Mark Gerath,
The Watershed Protection Approach: Is the Promise About to Be Realized?, Nat. Re-
sources & Env't, Fall 1996, at 16, 17-19 (explaining benefits of watershed-based approach
to regulation).
210 See Daniel C. Esty, Stepping Up to the Global Environmental Challenge, 8 Fordham
EnvtL LI. 103, 104-13 (1996) (explaining necessity of global-scale policymaking); see also
Martin J. LaLonde, Note, The Role of Risk Analysis in the 1992 Framework Convention
on Climate Change, 15 Mich. J. Int'l L. 215, 217-18 (1993) (arguing that global-scale
problems such as climate change are unique and demand new and systematic solutions).
211 See supra text accompanying notes 170-71; see also Kenneth J. Arrow, The Limits of
Organization 39-43 (1974) (discussing transaction costs in communication and dissemina-
tion of information); Richard B. Norgaard & Darwin C. Hall, Environmental Amenity
Rights, Transaction Costs, and Technological Change, 1 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 251 (look-
ing at transaction costs in environmental context).
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aimed at protecting rivers and surface water supplies, for example,
require some measure of highly technical analysis of the various pollu-
tants that might be present and the degree of harm they represent.
These scientific and risk assessment activities can be most efficiently
undertaken at a centralized level; the information developed then can
be shared broadly with state and local jurisdictions. 212 In applying this
scientific knowledge to the circumstances of a particular community,
however, it makes more sense to rely on a decentralized policy re-
gime. Partial devolution, in this case, allows local decisionmakers to
determine for themselves how to trade off the benefits of a cleaner
water supply against other investments in public health that might be
available to them, such as providing better prenatal health care.213
Decentralized implementation also helps to ensure that the informa-
tion that is localized (e.g., where pollutants are coming from) can effi-
ciently be factored into the policymaking process.
As noted in Part III, Superfund represents another policy prob-
lem that is amenable to shared responsibility. Federal authorities are
better positioned to develop technical information on the harms posed
by chemicals efficiently than are local authorities, given the significant
scale economies in analysis. But on-the-ground information about a
particular site and its likely future use makes local information critical.
Partial devolution, resulting in shared governance, is thus necessary
for effective results.
C. Competition and Cooperation
Optimal environmental governance requires not only market en-
hancement and proper jurisdictional allocations but also open and vig-
orous debate fueled by good data and careful analysis. The requisite
information and analytic rigor is best generated by a mix of competi-
tion and cooperation-"regulatory co-opetition"-among govern-
ment entities and between government and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs).214 Where lax bureaucratic behavior detracts
from environmental progress, competition can create pressures on
212 See Steinzor, supra note 4, at 168-71 (describing benefits of centralized data gather-
ing and analysis in terms of economies of scale).
213 Local control must be balanced with state regulation to protect both local and re-
gional interests. See, e.g., Michael C. Finnegan, New York City's Watershed Agreement:
A Lesson in Sharing Responsibility, 14 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 577, 625-43 (1997) (discussing
agreement achieving this balance in New York).
214 The benefit of structures that simultaneously promote both cooperation and compe-
tition is now understood. See Adam M. Brandenburger & Barry J. Nalebuff, Co-opetition
(1996) (arguing that competitors will sometimes need to cooperate and showing how this
can occur); see also Saul Levmore, Competition and Cooperation, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 216,
220-25 (1998) (reviewing circumstances where cooperation and competition coincide).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 74:1495
HeinOnline -- 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1556 1999
December 1999] TOWARD OPTIMAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 1557
regulating entities to perform their duties more efficiently. Competi-
tion can also bring more information into the policy process as con-
tending entities vie for attention and influence over the direction of
policies. But cooperation may also be both necessary and welfare en-
hancing when technical incapacity or other information failures ham-
per performance. 215 A degree of competition combined with a
measure of cooperation will, furthermore, be helpful in mitigating
public choice failures by intensifying the scrutiny of decisionmaking
officials and providing points of comparison about what sorts of re-
sults can be expected from government.
1. Competition
Environmental policymaking stands to benefit from expanded
"regulatory competition. ' 216 However, traditional Tieboutian models
of such competition-horizontally arrayed jurisdictions providing al-
ternative mixes of taxes and services, thereby creating a competitive
market in "locational rights"-represent far too limited a mechanism
for exerting real competitive pressure. A more focused and effective
form of regulatory competition is possible, based on a structure of
both vertical and horizontal pressures for effective and efficient deliv-
ery of government services in general and environmental policymak-
ing in particular.
a. Vertical Competition. The benefits of checks and balances
from a multi-tier structure of governance are well established in the
literature of federalism. 217 Dividing power among local, state, and
federal authorities has a hoary tradition. 218 At least part of the logic
for this division of power is that, if decision processes at one level of
215 See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 34 UCLA
L. Rev. 1, 33-66 (1997) (reviewing elements of collaborative approaches to problem solving
in decisionmaking processes of EPA and OSHA).
216 See Alvin Y. Klevorick, The Race to the Bottom in a Federal System: Lessons from
the World of Trade Policy, Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. and Yale J. on Reg. 177, 177 (Symposium
Issue 1996) (identifying cases where regulatory competition will enhance social welfare and
those where it will not); James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental Stan-
dards in a Federal System-And Why It Matters, 54 Md. L Rev. 1226, 1236-37 (1995)
(rebutting argument that interregional competition for industry will incur lower pollution
regulation); Revesz, supra note 1, at 1233-35 (explaining logic for welfare gains from envi-
ronmental policymaking competition).
217 See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1492-1519
(1987) (discussing advantages of federalism); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Rle of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Gov-
ernment, 54 Colum. L Rev. 543, 54647 (1954) (describing benefits of multilayered
government).
218 See, e.g., 5 The Writings of James Madison 22-27 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904) (develop-
ing logic of federal governance structure).
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government are suboptimal or distorted, these shortcomings can be
highlighted and perhaps even corrected by a parallel decisionmaking
process operating at a higher or lower level of government. For in-
stance, if state environmental regulators overlook the polluting activi-
ties of a particular factory (perhaps because its owners have made
significant campaign contributions to the governor), the presence of
local officials who demand action or of regulatory oversight from fed-
eral authorities can ensure that appropriate environmental protection
policies are pursued.2 19 A system of checks and balances thus makes
the misuse of political power in favor of selected groups harder to
sustain.
Enhanced regulatory competition also helps to address the perva-
sive uncertainty that plagues environmental policymaking by creating
incentives for the generation of data and analysis. Policies constructed
on the basis of multiple perspectives permit decisionmakers to trian-
gulate on the "truth." Issues misunderstood at one level may be bet-
ter analyzed at another. Thus, the quality of decisions about toxic
waste sites, where the risk of exposure to certain hazardous chemicals
was not fully appreciated locally, improves with federal knowledge
about the harms. Where, however, the policy shortcomings derive
from lack of federal understanding about the future use of a particular
parcel, the infusion of local knowledge will improve outcomes. Under
circumstances of vertical competition, the federal authorities have an
incentive to bring to bear information that others might not have and
local officials are motivated to shape the outcome in ways that reflect
their knowledge base.
The benefits of competition between governmental levels support
the creation of additional governance structures above the nation-
state. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), the Paris-based intergovernmental think tank comprised of
the twenty-nine most industrialized countries in the world, provides a
measure of competitive pressure in this regard. Portuguese environ-
ment officials report that the only time that they can get their Finance
Ministry interested in paying for improved environmental programs is
when they can cite OECD guidelines that call for the action.220 More
219 See Transcript of William D. Ruckelshaus' Remarks: EPA National Compliance and
Enforcement Conference, Envtl. F., Apr. 1984, at 14, 16-17 ("Our primary responsibility is
not to get along with the states, it is to ensure compliance.... Unless [the states] have a
gorilla in the closet they can't do the job. And the gorilla is EPA."). See generally Robert
V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54
Md. L. Rev. 1141, 1146-71 (1995) (discussing history of environmental federalism).
220 See Interview with Jorge Abreu Simones, Chief of Staff, Portuguese Secretary of
State for the Environment and Natural Resources, in Lisbon, Portugal (Feb. 25, 1993).
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broadly, the OECD's periodic reviews of its member countries' envi-
ronmental performance provide benchmarks for national environ-
mental policymakers. 22' By holding a nation's regulatory structure up
to scrutiny, international organizations can sharpen the national gov-
ernance process and improve policy results.
A better developed international environmental regime might
provide even stronger vertical competitive pressures. It would be use-
ful, for example, to have international officials as well as national offi-
cials designing climate change response strategies so that countries
such as the United States would have a wider spectrum of policy op-
tions to considerm Unfortunately, UNEP's weakness has meant that
there is little international oversight and feedback for many countries
in the world. One of the strongest arguments in favor of creating a
Global Environment Organization (GEO)m derives, therefore, from
the opportunity to improve national environmental policymaking
through the presence of overarching authorities that can provide criti-
cal independent perspectives on national environmental
performance.22 4
b. Horizontal Competition. The benefits of government-versus-
government competition in the environmental realm have been the
subject of ongoing academic debate.22- To the extent that some de-
gree of welfare loss from environmental regulation derives from bu-
reaucratic inefficiencies, horizontal competitive pressure will likely be
beneficial. New York officials may perform better knowing that New
Jersey is seeking to lure away its industry, in part, through a promise
of more streamlined regulation. In some cases, therefore, traditional
regulatory competition-horizontally arrayed jurisdictions competing
against each other and creating a market in "locational rights" that
allows industries (and citizens) to play one regulating authority
against another-will yield improved policy outcomes.22-
221 See OECD, Guiding the Transition to Sustainable Development: A Critical Role for
the OECD (1997) [hereinafter Critical Role] (Report of the High-Level Advisory Group
on the Environment to the Secretary-General of the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development).
222 See LaLonde, supra note 210, at 217-18 (describing need for global solutions to cli-
mate change).
223 See Esty, supra note 195, at 289-98 (detailing benefits of proposed Global Environ-
ment Organization (GEO) in combating externalities, promoting shared learning, and re-
ducing "political drag" of current system).
224 See Dua & Esty, supra note 44, at 99-107 (explaining value of international environ-
mental programs as mechanism for bolstering national policymaking).
225 See supra note 1.
226 See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdic-
tional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 Geo. I.. 201,
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In the environmental domain, however, the likelihood of ob-
taining welfare gains from state-versus-state or country-versus-coun-
try competition seems limited. The market for "locational rights" is
often rather attenuated.22 7 In too many cases, governments simply do
not feel competitive pressure from other governments. In other cases,
the existence of some degree of transboundary pollution spilovers or
of public choice distortions in the regulatory process makes the out-
come of the competition welfare reducing rather than welfare enhanc-
ing. In fact, competition in the presence of such market imperfections
can lead governments to set suboptimal policies, triggering a "race to-
ward the bottom" as competing governments set their policies defen-
sively and strategically rather than picking their own optimal policy
mix.2 2 8
Even when government-versus-government regulatory competi-
tion does not pose a risk of unleashing the "race toward the bottom"
dynamic, it may be that governments are not the best competitors.
Rather, regulatory competition between government departments in
the same jurisdiction and between governments and NGOs is likely to
engender greater pressure for improved efficiency than state-versus-
state competition.
In the policy process the most fierce competition is often among
competing departments within governments. In the United States, for
example, the EPA and the Department of Energy compete vigorously
over the design of climate change strategies.22 9 These two govern-
mental entities come at the greenhouse gas emissions problem from
very different starting points and with quite different bureaucratic
strengths. Likewise, at the international level, it is useful to have
UNEP and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment competing with the World Trade Organization (WTO) to de-
260-65 (1997) (discussing benefits and importance of regulatory competition); Paul G. Ma-
honey, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1453, 1454-55 (1997) (sketching benefits
of regulatory competition).
227 See Esty, supra note 1, at 629-34 (explaining why market for locational rights may
not function properly).
228 See Stewart, supra note 43, at 1211-12 (explaining incentives for individual jurisdic-
tions to set environmental standards lower than would centralized regulator); see also Esty,
supra note 1, at 630-34 (noting that government policymakers do not act under conditions
of perfect competition); Revesz, supra note 1, at 1243 (noting that "[a] state's failure to act
in an economically rational manner" may lead to races toward bottom).
229 See Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, "Half Seas Over": The Impact of Sea Level Rise on
International Law and Policy, 9 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 175, 184-85 (1991) (discussing
differing attitudes and regulatory approaches of EPA and DOE to climate change).
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velop strategies for integrating environmental policy considerations
into the global trading system.230
In addition, there exists a substantial opportunity to sharpen gov-
ernment regulatory performance by unleashing NGOs to act as intel-
lectual competitors in the policymaking domain.P 1 Indeed, in the
intellectual marketplace, it is often NGOs who most aggressively offer
alternative data or information, competing analyses, and new policy
options. 32 NGOs are entrepreneurial and shift resources toward new
issues quickly. NGOs also operate in a fiercely competitive market-
place for media and public attention as well as fundraising resources.
These pressures create a very strong incentive to come up with crea-
tive solutions to environmental problems and to "sell" solutions in the
appropriate governmental arena.3 3 The work of the Environmental
Defense Fund (EDF) to develop the tradable SO2 permit system that
is now embodied in the 1990 Clean Air Act provides an example of
NGO-based policy ideas beating the government competition and
winning approva13 The current work of EDF on emissions trading
structures that might be applicable in the climate change context dem-
onstrates the ongoing vitality of NGO competition as a mechanism for
improving environmental governance. s
2. Cooperation
A serious response to information failures and regulatory inca-
pacity also depends upon a certain degree of both vertical and hori-
zontal cooperation among governmental entities and between
governments and NGOs. A significant number of policy failures arise
230 See generally Esty, supra note 201, at 73-86 (advocating focus on GATT to inform
creation of Global Environmental Organization to mediate between free trade and envi-
ronmental interests).
231 See Daniel C. Esty, Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade Organiza-
tion: Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion, 1 J. Int'l Econ. L 123, 135-37 (1998) (dis-
cussing benefits of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as competitors).
2 2 See id. at 136 (explaining why NGOs often "outcompete" governments).
233 The recent demise of Greenpeace, which shut all of its U.S. regional offices last year,
demonstrates these competitive pressures in action. See generally id. at 142 (explaining
intellectual market discipline NGOs face).
234 See Michael H. Levin & Barry S. Elman, The Case for Environmental Incentives,
Envtl. F., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 7, 8 (noting "key role" EDF played in environmental
legislation).
235 See, e.g., Daniel J. Dudek et al., More Clean Air for the Buck: Lessons from the
U.S. Acid Rain Emissions Trading Program (1997) (presenting compilation of results of
U.S. acid rain emissions trading program, put together by EDF staff members); Environ-
mental Defense Fund, Emissions Budgets: Building an Effective International Green-
house Gas Control System (1997) (presenting EDF's recommendations for emissions
budget and trading system for greenhouse gasses).
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from a lack of solid analytic bases for policymaking233 6 Policy knowl-
edge is in many respects a public good that can be shared at no cost to
the provider and which will be underprovided absent collaborative ef-
forts. Some aspects of environmental governance, moreover, show
significant economies of scale. It does not make sense, for example,
for government authorities at every level of decisionmaking to repli-
cate each other's scientific or analytic work. When the federal govern-
ment determines the safe level of a pesticide residue, this information
can be disseminated both to the fifty states below and to other coun-
tries in the international domain. Such information sharing permits a
more streamlined regulatory process and reduced expenditures on
data collection and analysis.
Within the United States, this need for a more efficient environ-
mental governance structure supports the creation of a National Insti-
tute for the Environment. 237 Such a centralized environmental
information and analysis organization would be positioned to perform
or commission scientific studies and other analytic work and then
could provide the underlying data, information, risk analyses, epide-
miological and ecological studies, cost-benefit calculations, and policy
options to state and local regulators. While in some cases, competing
federal and state analyses would be useful, in most circumstances, in-
tergovernmental competition on technical issues is likely to consume
resources without yielding commensurate benefits. Social welfare is
more likely to be maximized by concentrating research resources in a
smaller number of technically competent hands and relying upon in-
formation sharing to ensure that all of the jurisdictions that must
make regulatory decisions have an adequate foundation for their poli-
cymaking processes.
To the extent that some regulatory decisions will be made at the
national level, it is important that there be vibrant regulatory authori-
ties at the state and local level to carry out the policies set above.
Cooperation in establishing and enforcing standards as well as in eval-
uating and refining environmental programs will yield considerable
236 A lack of capacity is especially likely to be a problem in environmental policymaking
on international matters. See Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sover-
eignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements 10, 13-15 (1995) (arguing
that lack of state capacity is one of three factors that limits treaty compliance). But it is
also an issue when authority is delegated to state or local government. See Environmental
Protection Agency, Report of the Task Force to Enhance State Capacity: Strengthening
Environmental Management in the United States 5-6 (1993) (describing need for enhanced
regulatory capacity in states).
237 See Committee for the Nat'l Inst. for the Env't, supra note 168, at 30-36 (setting out
details of proposed National Institute for the Environment).
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benefitsP38 Similarly, to the extent that some environmental decisions
are likely to evolve toward global-scale decisionmaking processes, na-
tional authorities must be carefully linked with the relevant interna-
tional bodies to ensure on-the-ground implementation of the policies
set at a worldwide scale. 39
NGOs, operating cooperatively with governments, can contribute
significantly to optimizing the functioning of policymaking processes
at more distant levels of government.240 In fact, one of the central
benefits of open decisionmaking procedures within governmental
bodies is the opportunity to ensure that NGOs can participate and
serve as conduits for the flow of information. Specifically, NGOs pro-
vide a mechanism for communicating the viewpoints of distant local
publics to centralized decisionmakers. In the recent ,VTO "shrimp-
turtle" case, for example, NGOs helped to make the dispute settle-
ment panel aware of the environmental interest, both as a matter of
scientific fact and as a matter of public sentiment, in protecting the
endangered sea turtles that were dying in the nets of Thai shrimp fish-
ermen.241 Such NGO linkages also permit decisions made at a high
level (particularly the international level) to be transmitted and ex-
plained to the disaggregated public.242
One might argue that governments should facilitate the commu-
nication required. In many cases, however, NGOs invest more re-
238 See Stephen M. Johnson, The Brownfields Action Agenda: A Model for Future Fed-
erallState Cooperation in the Quest for Environmental Justice?, 37 Santa Clara L Rev. 85,
114-15 (1996) (praising Brownfields Action Agenda as model for future cooperation);
Philip F. Schuster, II & Roger F. Dierking, Future Prospects for Mining and Public Land
Management: The Federal "Retention-Disposal" Policy Enters the Twenty-First Century,
26 Envtl. L. 489, 561 (1996) (noting benefits of federal-state cooperation in environmental
land management).
239 See Abram Chayes et al, Managing Compliance: A Comparative Perspective, in
Engaging Countries, supra note 37, at 39,49-50 (arguing for cooperative approach to inter-
national regulation); Royal C. Gardner, Taking the Principle of Just Compensation
Abroad: Private Property Rights, National Sovereignty, and the Cost of Environmental
Protection, 65 U. Cin. L. Rev. 539, 592 (1997) (arguing that successful environmental gov-
ernance must take cognizance of national sovereignty and work through negotiation and
cooperation).
240 See Esty, supra note 231, at 129-35 (discussing role of NGOs as "connective tissue"
between World Trade Organization (WTO) and citizens around world).
241 See, e.g., World Wide Fund for Nature Supplementary Amicus Curiae Brief to w'I o
Shrimp-Turtle Dispute (1998) (arguing for reversal of WTO's decision in Shrimp-lhrtle
dispute). See generally Panel on United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, Report, May 15, 1998 <http://www.wto.orghvtolddf/eplpublic.html>.
242 See Thomas Princen & Matthias Finger, Environmental NGOs in World Politics:
Linking the Local and the Global 34-36 (1994) (describing advantages of NGOs over na-
tional governments); Anthony Bebbington & John Farrington, Governments, NGOs and
Agricultural Development Perspectives on Changing Inter-Organisational Relationships,
29 J. Dev. Stud. 199,206-08 (1993) (describing capacity of agricultural NGOs for analysis
and dissemination).
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sources and carry out better dissemination procedures than
governments.243 The diversity of NGOs furthermore permits more
carefully tailored connections between people with certain interests
and decisionmaking processes in which their concerns will play out.2 44
An individual who cares, for instance, about the environmental deci-
sions being made at the WTO would find out a great deal more by
reading newsletters from the World Wildlife Fund than communiques
from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.
Horizontal cooperation among jurisdictions is also important for
optimal environmental governance. Within the United States, there
are many opportunities for states to work together in response to
common environmental problems.245 The benefits of "benchmarking"
and the value of disseminating "best practices" are well known in the
business world. 246 Information exchange is equally as central to good
environmental management. Indeed, the sharing of information and
policy experience is one of the ways that jurisdictions can move
quickly and efficiently toward better environmental outcomes.
The same logic applies at the international level. Technical assist-
ance from countries with more sophisticated environmental regulatory
structures to those with less sophisticated systems is an important as-
pect of the effort to improve environmental decisionmaking glob-
ally.24 7 To date, too little money has been invested in systematic
243 See Ann Marie Clark, Non-Governmental Organizations and Their Influence on In-
ternational Society, 48 J. Int'l Aff. 507, 518-21 (1995) (discussing sharing of information
between NGOs); Paul Ghils, International Civil Society: International Non-Governmental
Organizations in the International System, 44 Int'l Soc. SCI. J. 417, 421-24 (1992) (describ-
ing role of NGOs as shapers of opinion).
244 See, e.g., Philippe J. Sands & Albert P. Bedecarr6, Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species: The Role of Public Interest Non-Governmental Organiza-
tions in Ensuring the Effective Enforcement of the Ivory Trade Ban, 17 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L.
Rev. 799, 801 (1990) (discussing administrative role of NGOs in ivory ban); see also World
Wildlife Fund, International Wildlife Trade: A CITES Sourcebook 6-7 (Ginette Hemley
ed., 1994) (reviewing role of NGOs in making Convention on International Trade in En-
dangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) work).
245 See, e.g., Brett B. Coffee, Environmental Marketing After Association of National
Advertisers v. Lungren: Still Searching for an Improved Regulatory Framework, 6 Ford-
ham Envtl. LJ. 297, 302-03 (1995) (discussing task force recommendations for greater in-
formation sharing among state attorneys general on environmental issues).
246 Identifying the approaches that others use ("benchmarking") and using as a goal the
"best practices" uncovered is a standard business tool. See W.H. Weiss, Benchmarking:
Key to Being the Best, Supervision, Mar. 1996, at 14, 14 (explaining term).
247 See Environmental Protection Agency, Improving Technology Diffusion for Envi-
ronmental Protection 5-6 (1992) (setting forth environmental benefits of worldwide diffu-
sion of environmental technologies); David A. Wirth, Legitimacy, Accountability, and
Partnership: A Model for Advocacy on Third World Environmental Issues, 100 Yale L.J.
2645, 2649-55 (1991) (discussing need for partnership between developed and developing
nations).
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structures for data and information exchange at the international
level. Some work in this area has been done by the OECD, with con-
structive results.248 But the OECD membership is comprised entirely
of the most developed countries in the world, who least need the in-
formation exchange that is provided. The current international mech-
anisms to provide North-South data, technology, and policy transfers
are not functioning particularly well. 249 Thus, optimal environmental
governance, particularly at the international level, requires a greater
investment in institutional mechanisms to facilitate information flow
and more transparent decisionmaking processes to make information
accessible to all of the relevant actors, governmental and nongovern-
mental, who might contribute to the thinking about how to respond to
problems.
D. Public Engagement and Delegation
The combination of a functioning legal system, a multi-tier regu-
latory structure designed to correspond to various OEAs, and the cre-
ation of an appropriate mix of competitive and cooperative pressures
across governmental bodies and nongovernmental entities will go a
good distance toward addressing the regulatory failures identified in
Parts I and II. But none of these strategies will do much to address
the limitations of the human capacity for environmental decisionmak-
ing or the tendency of politicians and the public to disregard intertem-
poral pollution and resource impacts.
An appropriate response to these difficulties is much more diffi-
cult to define, in part because the regulatory failures arise from
human psychological and intellectual limitations.250 Nevertheless, one
can improve environmental decisionmaking processes through better
environmental education of both the public and decisionmaking offi-
cials, leading to fuller political dialogues' 1 More effective environ-
248 See Critical Role, supra note 221, at 36-39 (describing OECD's efforts toard infor-
mation exchange).
249 See Anne Gallagher, The "New" Montreal Protocol and the Future of International
Law for Protection of the Global Environment, 14 Hous. J. Int'l L 267, 347-48 (1992)
(arguing that UNEP's past weaknesses, lack of authority, control, and resources will
continue to hinder its future work); Gray, supra note 201, at 303-15 (describing UNEP's
fundamental weaknesses).
250 For a review of psychological limitations to good decisionmaking, see Symposium,
The Legal Implications of Psychology. Human Behavior, Behavioral Economics, and the
Law, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1495 (1998).
251 See Bruce A. Williams & Albert R. Matheny, Democracy, Dialogue, and Environ-
mental Disputes: The Contested Languages of Social Regulation 52 (1995) (arguing for
"equal access to usable information"). See generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey,
Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction (1991) (developing "neo-Madisonian"
theory of democratic governance).
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mental leadership from governmental quarters and NGOs might also
generate better outcomes.25 2
More public involvement in environmental decisionmaking is,
however, both difficult to engender and not necessarily construc-
tive.253 Public participation is often uninformed.2 54 Some commenta-
tors argue that public participation in environmental decisionmaking
is needed to improve the legitimacy of the process even if "technical
accuracy" is not advanced.2 55 The problem with this line of argument
is that the gain in legitimacy may be small and the loss in accuracy
may be large.
As Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer argues, the key to en-
vironmental policy success is authoritativeness.256 Justice Breyer fur-
ther notes that the chaos of uninformed public involvement is not
democracy,257 and the fact is that the public is not involved.25 8 Most
of the public, most of the time, rationally chooses not to engage in the
details of environmental policymaking. We should not, therefore, es-
tablish pollution control or resource management decisionmaking sys-
tems that rely, counterfactually, on an assumption of deep citizen
interest or involvement. Instead, we should push for a system that
generates good data and the most complete scientific and technical
information possible, within an institutionalized structure of counter-
vailing expert analysis and careful oversight by both political leaders
252 How much delegation of regulatory decisionmaking is optimal has been debated.
See, e.g., Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United
States 93-94, 126 (2d ed. 1979) (arguing against delegation to agencies); Peter H. Aranson
et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 37-67 (1982) (providing
public choice arguments against delegation); Mashaw, supra note 33, at 120-29 (milking
case for delegation to expert agencies).
253 For a good review of the "public versus experts" problem, see Gerrard, supra note
105, at 734-38.
254 See, e.g., Jonathan Baert Wiener & John D. Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs, in
Risk Versus Risk, supra note 38, at 226, 228-42 (identifying numerous sources of confusion
in analyzing risks); see also Breyer, supra note 7, at 10-29 (illustrating inefficiencies of
public participation in environmental decisionmaking).
255 See Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1027, 1104-05 (1990) (describing emergence of viewpoint that those placed at risk
should participate in decisionmaking in order to enhance legitimacy).
256 See Breyer, supra note 7, at 59-72 (calling for creation of administrative group within
executive branch that would build coherent risk-regulating system). See generally Cass R.
Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1129, 1138-40
(1986) (supporting limited "paternalism" in policymaking).
257 See Breyer, supra note 7, at 73-75 (arguing that more effective regulation through
executive branch would enhance democracy).
258 Grassroots environmentalists such as Mark Dowie argue that it is a core "right of
citizens to participate in environmental decision making." Mark Dowie, Losing Ground:
American Environmentalism at the Close of the Twentieth Century 135 (1995). But if the
vast majority choose not to exercise the right, the system degrades into one based on inter-
est groups.
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and the public. In moving toward such an approach to risk manage-
ment, we do not give up public participation in the environmental pol-
icy process. The public role is, however, channeled to engage citizens
on terms that match their degree of environmental interest.
Vigorous intellectual competition and information exchange
among governmental and nongovernmental experts offers a better ba-
sis for legitimacy. Pollution control and resource management deci-
sion processes should nevertheless be transparent and all of the
assumptions on which the analysis turns should be spelled out and
justified. The outcomes generated should be made public, widely dis-
seminated, and subject to both formal oversight by elected officials
and to informal review on an ongoing basis by any group or individual
who has data and information on the issues at hand.
Such an approach accepts and works with the fact that the pub-
lic's interest in environmental policy goes to "first order" questions
such as: Is the air breathable? Is the water clean enough to drink?
The politicians people elect are the ones who must make sure that the
correct governance processes exist and the correct environmental
agency appointees are in place to translate the public's broad ecologi-
cal and public health goals into detailed "second order" environmen-
tal laws, regulations, guidelines, and other commands. If the
politicians fail to meet public expectations in this domain, they should
face the public's wrath at the ballot box.
I confess that none of the strategies outlined here may do much
to address intergenerational equity issues-a tenacious source of pol-
icy failure 59 Getting politicians (and citizens) to pay attention to in-
tertemporal policy impacts may be more a function of spiritual
leadership than better secular education or heavier reliance on expert
opinion. The prospect of getting environmental decisionmakers to
give proper weight to issues of intergenerational equity is a moral and
philosophical matter that lies largely outside the realm of environmen-
tal policymaking.
V
COUNTERVAILING PROBLEMS AND RESPONSES
In optimizing any one dimension of the system necessary for
good environmental decisionmaking, there exists a risk that other
dimensions of the optimal environmental governance structure will be
259 For an alternative approach based on an extension of Breyer's call for an elite regu-
latory corps, see Bradford C. Mank, Protecting the Environment for Future Generations:
A Proposal for a "Republican" Superagency, 5 N.Y.U. Envtl. LJ. 444,447,488-514 (1996)
(explaining how elite "superagency" might serve to protect interests of future generations).
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negatively affected. For example, in moving some regulatory deci-
sions to higher governmental levels to respond to a problem of trans-
boundary externalities and the welfare losses that arise from
jurisdictional mismatches and structural governance failures, one suf-
fers a countervailing welfare loss in representativeness as the decision-
making process shifts to a more distant level of government. There
are, however, a number of strategies available to minimize these
knock-on effects and to further refine the opportunity for system-wide
optimization of environmental governance.
A. Unnecessary Investments in Governance
In some circumstances, notably when resources are abundant, the
investment in legal structures to protect property fights and to facili-
tate their exchange will be unnecessary.260 Simply put, the benefits of
managing abundant resources will not justify the costs.2 61 In these
cases, it makes sense to hold off on investing in legal systems in gen-
eral and in environmental governance procedures in particular until
the prospect of scarcity suggests that the welfare gains from having a
system will justify the costs of creating and operating a structure of
rules and procedures. Thus, for example, where fish are plentiful rela-
tive to the take by fishermen, it makes no sense to develop an elabo-
rate tradable allowances regime. The costs and burdens of such a
structure are only justified in the face of resource depletion.
B. Suboptimal Environmental Areas
Every environmental harm and resource has a unique geographic
footprint, defined by the reach of the relevant physical, economic, and
psychological externalities. This diversity of issues implies an almost
infinite number of OEAs and corresponding optimal jurisdictional re-
sponses.262 But the administrative costs of maintaining an increasingly
large number of regulatory structures will quickly overwhelm any ad-
260 But note that structures may need to be developed before a scarcity threshold is
reached. See James Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle: A Funda-
mental Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment, 14 B.C.
Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1, 21-27 (1991) (defining "precautionary principle" and advocating
application of principle to address environmental harms before they become dangerous);
Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary Principle, Environment,
Sept. 1991, at 4, 4-5 (explaining preventative role of "precautionary principle").
261 See Rose, supra note 5, at 14-19 (spelling out advantages of various environmental
strategies, including doing nothing if resource is not scarce).
262 In proposing a theory of optimal currency areas, Robert Mundell had to contend
with a very similar problem, since a parallel principle suggests a separate currency for each
discrete economic region in every country. See Mundell, supra note 208, at 660 (recogniz-
ing optimum currency area as region, rather than nation).
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vantages that accrue to regulating at the precisely optimal scale.
Moreover, too many rules and regulatory structures, attempting to ad-
dress every conceivable issue, produce chaos rather than effective
results.263
Theoretically, defining the optimal number of regulatory jurisdic-
tions presents a problem similar to the question of the optimal speci-
ficity of regulations.264 The solution requires a balancing of welfare
gains from precision in the geographic scope of regulation against the
need to minimize the administrative costs of multiple layers of regula-
tory activity. The theoretical attraction of defining an OEA for each
environmental problem must therefore be tempered in practice and
limited to a fixed number of regulatory jurisdictions. Domestically,
most countries have found it useful to have two (local and national) or
three (local, state/provincial, and national) levels of environmental
policy activity. Internationally, similar benefits would likely emerge
from having two (regional and global) and sometimes three (small re-
gional, larger regional, and global) primary tiers of environmental
policymaking.
The argument for expanded global environmental governance is
analytically powerful in a world where some harms span the planet,
and thus only a world-scale response will be structurally adequate. As
a practical matter, however, the leap from national to international
policymaking is a big one. The level of trust and of shared values
creating the spirit of community necessary for democracy to function
is often absent in the international arena. In fact, until we have a
deeper level of global politics265 that builds a sense of international
citizenship, with all of the attendant mutual obligations and rights, the
prospect for optimal international environmental governance -will re-
main stunted.
A second problem with the OEA theory, even as applied at the
national scale, arises from the fact that optimal regulation of any sin-
gle issue entails a variety of activities some of which are likely to bene-
fit from being more centralized and others of which are likely to be
optimized through more decentralized structures. Determining the
263 See Epstein, supra note 76, at 30-32 (arguing against elaborate rules because of their
direct and indirect administrative costs). But see Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity.
Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 Duke LJ. 1, 8 (1992) (arguing that complex
rules sometimes produce fairer and more refined results).
264 See generally Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93
Yale L.J. 65 (1983) (exploring concept of regulatory precision); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. Legal Stud. 257 (1974) (anal)z-
ing optimal specificity of system of rules).
265 See Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 28-30
(1983) (stressing that shared politics is what creates sense of community).
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level of threat to human health from radionuclides in drinking water is
best done at higher governmental levels that can afford the expensive
scientific and analytic work required. But deciding how much money
to invest in removing radionuclides from a particular water system re-
quires numerous tradeoffs based on local financial and ecological con-
ditions and is therefore better undertaken by state or local authorities.
Thus, while the OEA concept helps to define the optimal primary reg-
ulatory level, the system as a whole will function best if governmental
entities at various levels are all available to contribute to the policy
process.
266
Similarly, a push to devolve environmental decisionmaking to lo-
cal authorities may be useful as a way of minimizing internalities and
improving the affected public's connection to environmental deci-
sions, but it will often create a risk that complex policy determinations
will end up being made by officials whose technical capacity is lim-
ited.267 Thus, devolution in combination with the creation of effective
central environmental technical support systems, is likely to produce
better results than devolution alone.
Likewise, when the OEA dictates greater centralization because
of the broad scope of an environmental harm, matching large scale
governance with the creation of new structures to support information
flow back and forth to the now more distant public will produce better
results. This might entail increased government investments in keep-
ing citizens informed or expanded roles for NGOs, which often can
serve as a systematic link between decisionmakers at a centralized
level and the dispersed public.268
C. Competition and Cooperation
Creating the multi-tier structure necessary for optimal vertical
and horizontal "regulatory co-opetition" might produce a thick web of
entities contending for limited resources and policymaker attention.
There is, unfortunately, no simple formula that can be relied upon to
determine the optimal level or mix of entities and activities. More-
266 We may fall back to a model of "cooperative federalism," albeit more refined than
current approaches. See Percival, supra note 219, at 1174-75 (describing cooperative feder-
alism); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power, and
the Constitution, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 205, 212-22 (1997) (describing constitutional basis and
current practice of cooperative federalism).
267 As a general matter, more centralized authorities have more resources, both finan-
cial and technical, and are thus better able to do more rigorous scientific and economic
analyses.
268 See Esty, supra note 231, at 131-35 (explaining "linking" potential of NGOs in WTO
context); see also Princen & Finger, supra note 242, at 38-41 (describing NGOs as link
between international organizations and local concerns).
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over, it is clear that some participants in the process of checks and
balances will not be well positioned to play their roles effectively.
Considerable criticism, for instance, has been aimed at the environ-
mental decisionmaking of courts.269 Optimal structures must there-
fore emerge through a process of trial and error that ultimately
advances structures for promoting cooperation alongside a set of pro-
cedures that balance the benefits of competition among multiple ac-
tors against the need for streamlined decisionmaking. 0o
Some policy analysts are sure to take issue with the emphasis on
NGOs both as a source of competition for governments and as a
means of connecting governments and the public. In particular, some
commentators believe that NGOs act as special interest advocates and
thus tend to distort decisionmaking processes rather than enhance
them.27' The key to avoiding this downside to an NGO role in the
policymaking process lies in the establishment of administrative law,
rules, and procedures that channel and regulate NGO participation in
governance 2 72 Disclosure of who is being contacted on what issues
and limitations on the benefits that politicians and regulators can ac-
cept from special interest entities would help to minimize the risk of
special interest manipulation and ensure that NGO involvement in the
policymaking process is constructive.273
269 See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in
Resolving Business Disputes, 61 Brook. L Rev. 1, 42-43 (1995) (discussing judicial ten-
dency to favor business interests over environmental interests, or "race to the bottom");
Kenneth M. Murchison, Environmental Law in Australia and the United States: A Com-
parative Overview, 22 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L Rev. 503, 543-45 (1995) (discussing U.S. judicial
deference towards agencies in environmental realm).
270 See, e.g., Charles W. Powers & Marian R. Chertow, Industrial Ecology- Overcoming
Policy Fragmentation, in Thinking Ecologically, supra note 7, at 19,30-32 (arguing for trial
and error regulatory reform).
271 See Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes
to Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L 295, 318-19 (1996) (arguing that
expanding standing of special interest NGOs can cause inequity); Peter J. Spiro, New
Global Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizations and the "Unregulated" Marketplace,
18 Cardozo L. Rev. 957, 962-69 (1996) (discussing advantages and disadvantages of institu-
tionalizing role of NGOs in decisionmaking, especially at international level); Arvind Sub-
ramanian, Trade Measures for Environment: A Nearly Empty Box?, 15 World Econ. 135,
148-49 (1992) (reviewing risk of capture of trading system by special interests).
272 Significant lobbying, conflict of interest, financial disclosure, and campaign finance
limitations exist within some countries to address these risks. See, e.g., ABA, Election Law
Committee Panel Discussion: Revolutionizing Campaign Finance-An Appraisal of Pro-
posed Reforms, 13 J.L. & Pol. 163, 164-65, 189 (1997) (discussing campaign finance limita-
tions). The WTO, in fact, "directs governments to impose various disciplines on NGOs."
Steve Charnovitz, A Critical Guide to the WTO's Report on Trade and Environment, 14
Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L 341, 367 (1997).
273 See Esty, supra note 231, at 146 (explaining why informal ex pare contacts rather
than formal NGO communications represent real risk of policy manipulation and how dis-
closure rules might address issue).
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The need for more robust administrative law and lobbying con-
trols is especially acute in the international domain. There exists, for
example, an emerging system of international governance centered in
the WTO, but the administrative rules and procedures of this body
and other international organizations have not kept pace with their
evolving responsibilities and the need for more formal administrative
law.274
D. Nonenvironmental Tradeoffs
Environmental "success" will sometimes conflict with other social
goals. Investing in an optimal environmental governance structure
may limit the resources available for other public goods, such as im-
proved health care, crime fighting, or education. Similarly, effective
environmental procedures may not take full cognizance of other social
values such as justice or equity. If all the fish are owned by the rich, a
property rights-based allocation system may be efficient, but it will not
be just. Optimal environmental governance must therefore be under-
stood to be both relative and contextual. A theory of optimal govern-
ance defines a theoretical goal and a process, but does not offer a
definitive answer to every policy question.
CONCLUSION
Improved environmental policy outcomes that produce greater
social welfare while respecting property rights can be achieved by var-
ious improvements in governmental (and nongovernmental) struc-
tures and functions. Emphasis must be placed not only on who
governs but also on how decisions are made and implemented. The
key to good environmental results is better institutional performance
as well as refined structures.
Even before taking up the issue of environmental governance,
ensuring that there exists a legal system that delineates and enforces
property rights over environmental resources can provide an impor-
tant foundation for improved pollution control and resource manage-
ment. In some cases, the creation of a legal structure must begin with
a focus on defining property rights. Other cases require setting up
mechanisms to ensure that these rights can be vindicated when they
have been infringed upon or to promote the efficient purchase and
sale of these rights. Advances in information technologies and policy
understanding will likely expand the number of environmental issues
274 See John Jackson, Reflections on Constitutional Changes to the Global rading Sys-
tem, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 511, 517-18 (1996) (analyzing WTO struggles with participation
and transparency); Spiro, supra note 271, at 966-67 (arguing for "process legitimacy").
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amenable to property rights-based fixes. But ongoing limitations to a
fully functioning market in environmental rights will mean that in
many circumstances the goal must be enhanced capacity to use mar-
ket-based regulatory tools.
To the extent that property rights-based solutions to environmen-
tal problems fail to move us sufficiently down the road toward optimal
environmental outcomes, we must pay attention to improving the per-
formance of our governance structure for pollution and resource is-
sues. The diversity of environmental policy problems (which span a
variety of geographic scales) and the range of regulatory activities that
must be undertaken (which vary widely with respect to the disecono-
mies or economies of scale they present) argues for a multi-tier envi-
ronmental governance structure. The jurisdictional question of
defining the scope of the primary regulatory authority turns on the
need to encompass within the regulatory calculus all of the potential
cost bearers and beneficiaries of governmental intervention27 5 While
every problem is likely to have a unique OEA, the prospect of bur-
geoning administrative costs suggests that the multi-tier regulatory
structure must be limited to a finite number of layers. Two or three
levels of regulatory activity within the nation-state and two or three
more levels in the international domain seem likely to be advanta-
geous.276 Partial devolution of authority from more centralized gov-
ernment officials to decentralized entities can help to prevent the
political tensions and costs that arise when a subset of the population
has views that diverge from the larger political jurisdiction of which it
is a part.
Optimal environmental governance also requires increased infor-
mation flows and greater analytic rigor-and thus an appropriate mix
of competitive pressures and support for regulatory collaboration.
The checks and balances that are likely to be part of an optimal envi-
ronmental governance structure include both alternative environmen-
tal decisionmaking processes at multiple levels of government
(vertical checks) and an array of competing institutional actors (hori-
zontal checks), including other governmental bodies and NGOs. This
more wide-ranging approach to regulatory competition can help to
minimize the administrative inefficiencies of bureaucratic activity and
to spur environmental policy creativity without triggering the risk of a
welfare-reducing race toward the bottom. A degree of intergovern-
mental and public and private sector cooperation is also necessary to
275 "All" should be understood to permit the exclusion of parties affected in a de mini-
mus way at the fringes.
276 See Schuck, supra note 263, at 18 (arguing that in our increasingly interdependent
world, "a denser, more intricate legal system may be both inevitable and desirable").
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ensure that information gaps and regulatory incapacity do not become
a major obstacle to good environmental governance. Thus, the ulti-
mate goal must be a model of "regulatory co-opetition."
The public's disengagement from day-to-day environmental deci-
sionmaking must be acknowledged and accepted. The limited public
interest in pollution control and resource management policymaking
processes should be channeled into oversight mechanisms that allow
for a crosscheck on expert decisions. To the extent that shortcomings
in the environmental policymaking process can be traced to human
intellectual or psychological limitations, the solutions must be found
outside of any theory of environmental governance. Public education,
leadership, and spiritual development will prove to be more effica-
cious in this domain than refinement of regulatory processes.
Ultimately, no universally applicable optimal environmental gov-
ernance structure can be defined. The right structure and policy mix
will evolve over time. As decentralized authorities (e.g., U.S. state-
level departments of environmental protection) gain greater regula-
tory capacity, they can take on a larger share of environmental policy
determination and implementation. Likewise, as countries move up
the development ladder, opportunities will emerge to build the sys-
tems needed for property rights-based approaches to pollution control
and resource management, or for more advanced regulatory strate-
gies. More generally, as the potential of the Information Age is real-
ized, the opportunity to shift environmental policy toward more
refined and individually tailored approaches looms large.
Better environmental results depend less on fine tuning theories
of environmental federalism than on improving regulatory perform-
ance. In this respect, both the governance structure and the function-
ing of the policymaking process matter.
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